We examine the impact of securities class action lawsuits on firms' investment and financing choices. Firms which overinvest are more likely to be sued. After a lawsuit, firms on average decrease overinvestment activity, and they decrease payouts while increasing leverage, cash holdings, and firm-specific risk. Additionally, we find some evidence that firms decrease diversification post-suit. Overall, these changes are consistent with a post-suit decrease in agency problems which lead to significant changes in real investment policies. The evidence is consistent with the notion that security class action lawsuits draw attention to agency problems which are then at least partly resolved.

US manufacturing firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less debt, while antitakeover statutes do not significantly reduce long-run leverage. Correcting for the endogenously determined choice of where to incorporate, we find that firms sort themselves according to state laws and capital structure needs. After accounting for self-selection, state antitakeover laws are positively associated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to lower market values for these firms. Payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not reincorporated outside their home states. These constraints explain part of the negative relation between profitability and leverage.

We provide a firm level analysis of the impact of capital market liberalization in 18 emerging markets. Consistent with models of international asset pricing, we find that firms’ stock returns increase during liberalization and that a majority of firms have lower mean returns and lower dividend yields after liberalization. We also find that emerging market firms have increased exposure to the world market and decreased exposure to the home market following liberalization. These changes in returns and exposures support the predictions of theoretical international asset pricing models. We also test and find support for the importance of size, local risk, foreign exchange risk, and cross-listing status in explaining the cross-section of changes in returns.

We investigate how switching between two alternative management structures affects firms, and how this impact varies with firm size. Under one structure a single executive serves as both chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board (COB). Under the alternative structure two separate executives fill these positions. In order to evaluate which management structure is optimal, we examine the impact of a change in management structure on firm performance. A change from one to two executives induces negative abnormal returns for small firms, but positive abnormal returns for large firms. These impacts are also evident with accounting profitability measures of returns. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that small firms benefit more from the clarity and decisiveness of decision-making under a single executive, while large firms benefit more from the checks and balances of having two executives in the CEO and COB positions.

Consistent with flight-to-quality, the coskewness between developed market sovereign bonds and global equity markets can help explain bond returns. A coskewness factor, defined as the return difference between the most negative coskewness bond portfolio and the most positive coskewness bond portfolio, carries a statistically significant unit price of risk of 43.8 basis points per month. Decreases in coskewness are also significantly associated with declines in bond yields. Coskewness declines during recessions when interest rates become low. Moreover, countries with a monetary policy regime which explicitly targets monetary aggregates have lower coskewness.

We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excess compensation of directors and managers. We also find evidence that excess compensation (both director and CEO) is associated with firm underperformance. We therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual back scratching or cronyism. The evidence suggests that excessive compensation has an effect on firm performance that is independent of the poor governance variables discussed by previous studies.

We examine the impact of influenza on stock markets. For the United States, a higher incidence of flu is associated with decreased trading, decreased volatility, decreased returns, and higher bid-ask spreads. Consistent with the flu affecting institutional investors and market makers, the decrease in trading activity and volatility is primarily driven by the incidence of influenza in the greater New York City area. However, the effect of the flu on bid-ask spreads and returns is related to the incidence of flu nationally. International data confirm our findings of a decrease in trading activity and returns when flu incidence is high.

Upon examining the language used in recent SEC filings, we find that severance agreements are often paid whether or not the CEO leaves the firm due to a change in control. We hypothesize that since severance agreements compensate CEOs in the event of termination, CEOs with these agreements will have an incentive to increase firm risk and decrease effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, we document a significant positive relation between the use of severance agreements and the cost of debt (10% higher yield spreads for firms with severance agreements). The results hold after controlling for the probability of takeover, the probability of CEO turnover, and whether the firm has investment or non-investment grade debt. These results can be explained by an increase in firm risk and a higher likelihood of CEO turnover associated with severance agreements. Overall, the evidence suggests that the effects of severance agreements extend beyond takeovers, and that these additional implications are primarily negative for the firm and for debt holders in particular.

Using a GARCH approach, we estimate a time-varying two-factor international asset pricing model for weekly equity index returns of 16 OECD countries. A trade-weighted basket of exchange rates and the MSCI world market index are used as risk factors. We find significant currency risk exposures in country equity index returns. We then explain these currency betas using several country-specific macroeconomic variables with a panel approach. We find that imports, exports, credit ratings, and tax revenues significantly affect currency risks in a way that is consistent with some economic hypotheses. Similar conclusions are obtained by using lagged explanatory variables, and thus these macroeconomic variables may be useful as predictors of currency risk exposures. Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.