This article explores the price behavior of a sample of corporate securities in which trading was temporarily suspended by the SEC. Suspensions are found to coincide with substantial devaluations of the suspended securities. Further, significant and prolonged negative abnormal returns are observed in the postsuspension period, an apparent violation of semistrong form market efficiency.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option‐pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

We examine the impact of stock market liquidity on managerial payout decisions. We argue that stock market liquidity influences payout policy through a first-order effect on the share repurchase decision, and a second-order or residual effect on the dividend decision. Managers compare the tax and flexibility advantages of a repurchase against its liquidity cost disadvantage. All else equal, higher market liquidity encourages the use of repurchases over dividends. Our empirical results confirm that stock market liquidity plays a significant role in repurchase and dividend initiations, as well as in recurring payout decisions. Unlike previous studies that measure liquidity changes following the repurchase decision, we examine liquidity levels prior to the payout decision. We show that managers condition their repurchase decision on a sufficient level of market liquidity, consistent with Barclay and Smith's [Barclay, M.J., Smith, C.W. Jr., 1988. Corporate payout policy: cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 61–82.] theoretical analysis and Brav et al.'s [Brav, A., Graham, J.R., Campbell, R.H., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483–528.] CFO survey results. Repurchases have recently become the payout decision of choice in part because of rising stock market liquidity.

We examine the information environments of firms following large, non-recurring charges (“baths”). We test competing hypotheses about the consequences of a bath—a bath either improves the information environment (the transparency hypothesis) or degrades it (the opacity hypothesis). Difference-in-differences analysis suggests that after a bath (1) earnings become smoother, (2) firm-level information asymmetry decreases, and (3) stock returns become more responsive to unexpected earnings. We interpret these findings as supportive of the transparency hypothesis. We also document that the relative improvement in the information environment is greater for baths that are not voluntary, consistent with managerial obfuscation prior to the bath.

A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used to examine the relation between aggregate insider transactions and stock market returns. Consistent with the extant literature, there is some predictive content associated with aggregate insider transactions, but its magnitude is slight. In contrast, market returns have substantial influence on the aggregate purchases and sales of corporate insiders. The findings suggest that: 1) the degree of mispricing observed by insiders is small; 2) very little of the mispricing is associated with unanticipated macroeconomic factors; and 3) investors cannot use aggregate insider transactions to profitably predict future market returns over the following eight weeks.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid‐ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, we provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.

In this paper, we examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid-ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, we provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.