The petrochemical industry employs assets subject to temporal and site specificity. The OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s made it difficult to write contracts covering business dealings in the industry. I use this production and economic setting as a natural experiment to test transaction cost theory. In support of the theory, I find that input price uncertainty in the 1970s positively affected the extent of vertical integration by firms into input stages. Moreover, the positive reaction of vertical integration to price uncertainty mainly occurs in transactions subject to asset specificity. I also examine price controls and market power as alternative explanations for vertical integration in the industry, but fail to find support for these hypotheses.

Ownership structure plays a critical role in the incentives and behaviors of business organizations. The literature has focused on the effects of firm ownership dispersion across managers and investors. We extend the literature by examining the roles of ownership structure within a controlling family. Specifically, we focus on the family trust structure, which is a popular vehicle for holding family ownership around the world. The trust structure typically locks controlling ownership within a family for a very long period. Although it ensures family control, the share transfer restriction may induce family shirking problems, make family conflicts difficult to resolve, and distort firm decisions. Based on a sample of publicly traded family firms in Hong Kong, we report that trust-controlled firms that are more susceptible to these problems tend to pay higher dividends, invest less in the long term, and experience worse performance. The costs of using a trust structure are more significant when the family stakes have been locked inside the trust for a longer period and when a larger amount of family ownership is held by the trust.

This paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from Thailand, show that the family firm’s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.

We examine whether adding more founding family members as firm owners and/or managers matters to corporate governance outcomes. Based on a sample of 1242 founder-controlled publicly traded Chinese private-sector firms, we find that more such family involvement is associated with lower volumes of related party transactions suspicious of expropriating shareholder wealth. The curtailing relation is stronger when family members own firm shares and/or serve as managers, and are more arm's-length relatives instead of immediate kin of the founders. The intra-family governance effects are stronger when firms are subject to weaker capital market disciplines or have more free cash under insider discretion. The overall evidence is consistent with founding family members' information advantages and ownership incentives making them more robust monitors of managerial decisions than other formal mechanisms, which help enforce shareholder rights in emerging markets.

This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings–return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Second, concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership concentration prevents leakage of proprietary information about the firms’ rent-seeking activities.

There are important organizational and behavioral differences between firms in emerging markets and those in developed markets. We propose a top-down approach to understand how key institutional forces shape the structures and policies of firms in emerging markets. We review a selective set of prior studies as well as papers included in this Special Issue in identifying government quality, state ownership, and financial development as critical institutional forces that shape the financing and governance of firms in emerging markets. We suggest that future research should pay attention to several important but unanswered topics related to informal enforcement, government incentives, family firms, and network organizations.

We investigate how institutional factors influence the behavior of distressed firms in emerging markets, where bankruptcy laws are often weak and debtors have greater bargaining power in distress. By studying two comprehensive samples of distressed firms in China, we find that local government quality and corporate ownership structure matter considerably to firm performance during distress. Distressed companies facing stronger institutional discipline and with greater private ownership have relatively better operating performance and are more likely to recover. Our results remain robust when we control for the endogeneity of entering distress, use different institutional proxies, and implement various definitions for distress.

Using a sample of 231 firms in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, we examine the changes in firms' accounting practice around leadership successions-the turnovers of chairmen. We find that the successions are associated with reduction in the firms' unsigned discretionary accruals and an increase in timely loss recognition. We argue that the incumbent chairmen cannot transfer most of their unique assets, such as reputation and political/social networks, to their successors, resulting in reduced relationship-based contracting post succession. This change from relationship-based to market-based contracting also shifts the firms to a less insider-based accounting system. Moreover, we find that the extent of the shift in accounting is larger in founder successions ( turnovers of chairmen that are founders) than in subsequent ( non-founder) successions, possibly because the loss of unique assets is more pronounced in the first succession than in subsequent successions.

Where legal systems and market forces enforce contracts inadequately, vertical integration can circumvent these transaction difficulties. But, such environments often also feature highly interventionist government, and even corruption. Vertical integration might then enhance returns to political rent-seeking aimed at securing and extending market power. China offers a suitable background for empirical examination of these issues because her legal and market institutions are generally weak, but nonetheless exhibit substantial province-level variation. We report that Chinese firms in the 2000's are more vertically integrated than the U.S. firms in the 1990s. We find that vertical integration is more common where legal institutions are weaker and where regional governments are of lower quality or more interventionist. Further, firms led by insiders with political connection are more likely to be vertically integrated. Finally, vertical integration among politically unconnected firms is associated with elevated per capita GDP level and growth, while vertical integration among politically connected firms is unrelated to local economy performance.

We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals.