In their comment, Taylor, Kreisle and Zimmerman use gasoline price data taken from fleet card transactions at selected gasoline stations to re-examine a subset of results presented in Hastings (2004). Bringing new data to re-examine the question is a helpful contribution. Both data sets have limitations, potentially causing differences in the estimated effect. I worked with the authors to explore and understand the differences in the data sets and how they impact the estimates in both analyses, and conclude that the effects sizes are likely smaller in areas of overlap between the two data sets.

Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California by Justine S. Hastings. Published in volume 94, issue 1, pages 317-328 of American Economic Review, March 2004

We examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower-income families in a public school choice plan. Receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher-performing schools. Parents with high-scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores. Using random variation from each experiment, we find that attending a higher-scoring school increases student test scores. The results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose.

Investigating Income Effects in Scanner Data: Do Gasoline Prices Affect Grocery Purchases? by Dora Gicheva, Justine Hastings and Sofia Villas-Boas. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 480-84 of American Economic Review, May 2010

This paper examines how sales force impacts competition and equilibrium prices in the context of a privatized pension market. We use detailed administrative data on fund manager choices and worker characteristics at the inception of Mexico's privatized social security system, where fund managers had to set prices (management fees) at the national level, but could select sales force levels by local geographic areas. We develop and estimate a model of fund manager choice where sales force can increase or decrease customer price sensitivity. We find exposure to sales force lowered price sensitivity, leading to inelastic demand and high equilibrium fees. We simulate oft proposed policy solutions: a supply‐side policy with a competitive government player and a demand‐side policy that increases price elasticity. We find that demand‐side policies are necessary to foster competition in social safety net markets with large segments of inelastic consumers.

Gender and Performance: Evidence from School Assignment by Randomized Lottery by Justine S. Hastings, Thomas J. Kane and Douglas O. Staiger. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 232-236 of American Economic Review, May 2006

Rising student loan default rates and protests over debt suggest that many students make college enrollment and financing choices they regret. Policymakers have considered tying the availability of federally subsidized loans at degree programs to financial outcomes for past students. This paper considers the implementation of such a policy in Chile. We describe how loan repayment varied by degree type at baseline, the design of the loan reform, and how earnings-based loan caps change availability of loans and incentives for students and higher education institutions. We discuss the challenges facing policymakers seeking to link loan availability to earnings outcomes.