We study how information disclosure affects financial intermediation when the payoff to the long-term investment is risky. The analysis is based on a business-cycle version of the bank run model wherein a bank provides risk sharing to demand depositors who experience unobservable shocks to their liquidity preferences. The bank pre-commits to the precision of an interim signal regarding the payoff to the long-term investment. We examine the impact of bank disclosure on optimal risk sharing achieved by run-proof, signal-contingent demand-deposit contracts. We show that for utility functions that display non-increasing absolute risk aversion, more informative disclosure improves the ex ante risk sharing provided by financial intermediation.

We examine firms' financial reporting practices during the missing months that are induced by fiscal year changes and not covered by regular quarters. We find that firms tend to report much lower income for the missing months than for adjacent quarters, mainly by recording higher operating expenses. We also find that managers have various incentives to manage earnings. Executive compensation is not tied to firm performance in the transition period as it is in adjacent fiscal years. Growth firms, firms with poor stock returns, and firms with weak external and internal monitoring tend to manage earnings more. Finally, we find that firms are more likely to meet or beat earnings targets in the subsequent quarter by reporting lower income in the missing months. Investors and analysts perceive the earnings surprise to be less persistent in the quarter after than in the quarter before the missing months. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

We examine whether prior findings on the market pricing of accruals quality (AQ) can be attributed to other forms of accounting‐based anomalies. Using hedge portfolio analysis and cross‐sectional regressions, we find that the return predictive power of AQ overlaps with several other accounting signals. We also find that, similar to other accounting‐based anomalies, especially the accruals anomaly, the AQ pricing effect (i) is likely due to mispricing instead of risk pricing, (ii) is attenuated in recent years, and (iii) disappears among firms with cash flow forecasts or long‐term growth forecasts. Our findings highlight the importance of controlling for existing return predictive signals when evaluating the market pricing of AQ.

SEC-mandated, machine-readable structured filings are an alternative source to Compustat for companies' accounting data. Discrepancies between as-filed and Compustat data, potentially a result of Compustat's standardizations, are more pronounced for firms with complex financial reporting. We show that these data discrepancies affect inferences in four research settings: (i) properties of accrual accounting, including accruals-cash flow relationships and abnormal accruals; (ii) real earnings management; (iii) the existence and magnitude of six of 21 accounting-based anomalies examined, including the accruals anomaly; and (iv) disclosure quality assessments based on the hierarchical structure of financial statement items. FactSet data also exhibit significant and often larger discrepancies from as-filed data. Our findings demonstrate the importance of these data discrepancies for the interpretation of empirical tests.

We examine whether firms that imitate peer companies’ strategies (copycats) profit from such behavior and how their success may cause competitive harm to disclosing companies. We identify copycat companies by tracking the digital footprints of investment companies that view disclosures on the SEC EDGAR Web site. We find that copycat companies are able to identify profitable trades that outperform other trades disclosed by the copycatted companies by 5.5% annually. Such stock‐screening skills are related to investment sophistication and research intensity. Furthermore, copycats inflict greater damage on the performance of disclosing companies when they possess superior copycat skills, when disclosed trading strategies take longer to complete, and when disclosed stock holdings are characterized by high information asymmetry.