We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.

We study the effect of bank governance on risk-taking in commercial lending. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers. This effect is restricted to periods of distress in the banking industry and is stronger at banks with board-level credit committees. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers right after the Russian default, which exogenously imposed distress conditions on U.S. banks. Thus, value-maximizing banks appear to ration credit to riskier borrowers precisely when such firms might be credit-constrained, suggesting that bank governance regulations may have potential unintended consequences.

Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers to the acquisition deals they advise on, we find that individual investment bankers with greater deal experience are associated with higher acquisition returns and post-acquisition operating performance, particularly for acquirers in complex and more opaque industries. The advisory fee on acquisitions is also positively associated with the investment banking team’s experience. Finally, when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that the human capital of individual investment bankers is valuable to acquirers.

We analyze how increased access to financing affects firm total factor productivity (TFP) by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulations that increased access to bank financing. We find that firms' TFP increases after their states implement these deregulations. Using a regression discontinuity approach based on the Small Business Administration's funding eligibility criteria, we show that TFP increases following the deregulations are significantly greater for financially constrained firms. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up.

Using a unique sample of plant level data from the Longitudinal Research Database of the U.S. Census Bureau, which enables us to correctly identify the parent and spun-off entities prior to spin-offs, we establish that efficiency improves following spin-offs. A spin-off refers to the separation of the management of some assets of a firm into a separate entity (which we term as the spun-off entity or subsidiary). We investigate the underlying mechanisms and the real effects of spin-offs after correcting for potential endogenous selection using treatment effect estimators and propensity score matching in our analysis. We identify how (the precise channel and mechanism), where (parent or subsidiary), and when (the dynamic pattern) efficiency improvements arise following spin-offs. We show that spin-offs increase total factor productivity (TFP) and that such productivity improvements are long-lived. This post spin-off productivity improvement can be attributed to cost savings but not to higher sales. Further, such improvements arise primarily in plants remaining with the parent. However, contrary to speculation in the previous literature, we show that plants that are spun-off do not underperform parent plants prior to the spin-off. We identify acquisitions following spin-offs and find that while productivity improvements occur immediately after the spin-off in non-acquired plants, they start only after being taken over by another firm in acquired plants. Finally, we show that unrelated spun-off entities show greater improvements in productivity compared to related spun-off entities.

We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms, to study several related questions regarding the efficiency gains generated by venture capital (VC) investment in private firms. First, do VCs indeed improve the efficiency (total factor productivity, TFP) of private firms, and if so, are certain kinds of VCs (high reputation vs. low reputation) better at generating such efficiency gains than others? Second, do VCs invest in more efficient firms to begin with (screening), or do they improve efficiency after investment (monitoring)? Third, do efficiency improvements due to VC backing arise from increases in sales or reductions in costs? Fourth, do VC backing and the associated efficiency gains affect the probability of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition)? Our analysis shows that the overall efficiency of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms at every point in time. This efficiency advantage of VC-backed firms arises from both screening and monitoring: The efficiency of VC-backed firms prior to receiving financing is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, and further, the growth in efficiency subsequent to VC financing is greater for such firms. The above increases in efficiency of VC-backed firms are spread over the first two rounds of VC financing after which the TFP of such firms remains constant until exit. Additionally, we show that while the TFP of firms prior to receiving financing is lower for high-reputation VC-backed firms, the increase in TFP subsequent to financing is significantly greater for these firms, consistent with high-reputation VCs having greater monitoring ability. We disentangle the screening and monitoring effects of VC backing using three different methodologies: switching regression with endogenous switching, regression discontinuity analysis, and propensity score matching. We show that while overall efficiency gains generated by VC backing arise primarily from improvements in sales, the efficiency gains of high-reputation VC-backed firms arise also from lower increases in production costs. Finally, we show that VC backing and the associated efficiency gains positively affect the probability of a successful exit.

Using panel data on top management characteristics and a management quality factor constructed using common factor analysis on individual management quality measures, we analyze the relation between top firm management quality and corporate innovation input and output. We show that top management quality is an important determinant of corporate innovation, with individual aspects of management quality affecting innovation in younger and older firms differently. Further, firms with higher top management quality engage in more risky (“explorative”) innovation strategies. Finally, hiring more and higher-quality inventors is an important channel through which firms with higher management quality achieve greater innovation output.