Consistent with the prevailing socio-political ideology of China, the Chinese government offers financial assistance to firms, including many listed companies. Government subsidies are provided for several reasons including support for investment, support to enable firms to pursue social objectives, and support to prop up ailing firms in order to protect jobs. We examine the value relevance of government subsidies for Chinese listed companies and structure our study around three questions. First, whether the subsidies received by Chinese listed companies are value relevant consistent with their time-series properties. Second, whether the value relevance of subsidies depends on the purpose for which they are used. Third, whether the value relevance of subsidies depends on the channel through which they are granted. We motivate these research questions through interviews of accountants, managers, academics, government officials and financial analysts. Through large sample analyses, we confirm that subsidies are positively related to firm value, but less so for distressed firms and subsidies granted through non-tax channels. Our study contributes to improved understanding of Chinese-style capitalism.

We view audit-quality choice as one among many that managers make to maximize firm value. We question whether audit-quality differences among publicly traded companies are of significant interest to investors, clients, and auditors and ask for research on this topic. Relatedly, we ask for research on whether auditors and their clients show behavior consistent with regulated audit quality exceeding the audit quality level demanded absent regulation. We propose that researchers incorporate the competitive advantages of auditors and the institutional features of the audit process into the definition of audit quality. We propose that audit quality research test for externalities and inefficiencies to understand whether auditors and their clients are choosing the efficient level of audit quality. We note the legislative, judicial, and executive powers residing in the PCAOB.