We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the policy rate signals the central bank’s view about macroeconomic developments to price setters. The model is estimated with likelihood methods on a U.S. data set that includes the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a measure of price setters’ inflation expectations. This model improves upon existing perfect information models in explaining why, in the data, inflation expectations respond with delays to monetary impulses and remain disanchored for years. In the 1970s, U.S. monetary policy is found to signal-persistent inflationary shocks, explaining why inflation and inflation expectations were so persistently heightened. The signalling effects of monetary policy also explain why inflation expectations adjusted more sluggishly than inflation after the robust monetary tightening of the 1980s.

We estimate a state-of-the-art DSGE model to study the natural rate of interest in the United States over the last 20 years. The natural rate is highly procyclical, and fell substantially below zero in each of the last three recessions. Although the drop was of comparable magnitude across the three recessions, the decline was considerably more persistent in the Great Recession. We discuss the usefulness and limitations, particularly due to the zero lower bound, of the natural rate for the conduct of monetary policy.

The low rate of inflation observed in the United States over the past decade is hard to reconcile with traditional measures of labor market slack. We develop a theory-based indicator of interfirm-wage competition that can explain the missing inflation. Key to this result is a drop in the rate of on-the-job search, which lowers the intensity of interfirm-wage competition to retain or hire workers. We estimate the on-the-job search rate from aggregate labor-market flows and show that its recent drop is corroborated by survey data. During “the great resignation,” interfirm-wage competition rose, increasing inflation by around 1 percentage point in 2021.

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization, and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents’ uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty eventually accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing that inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned raises uncertainty. However, these announcements lower policy uncertainty and curb inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the United States, enhancing transparency raises welfare.

We show that policy uncertainty about how the rising public debt will be stabilized accounts for the lack of deflation in the US economy at the zero lower bound. We first estimate a Markov-switching VAR to highlight that a zero-lower-bound regime captures most of the comovements during the Great Recession: a deep recession, no deflation, and large fiscal imbalances. We then show that a microfounded model that features policy uncertainty accounts for these stylized facts. Finally, we highlight that policy uncertainty arises at the zero lower bound because of a trade-off between mitigating the recession and preserving long-run macroeconomic stability.