This paper investigates whether a firm's debt maturity structure affects the quality of its risk disclosures. Using a sample of U.S. public firms from 2005 to 2017, we provide robust evidence that a firm's exposure to refinancing risk, measured as the proportion of long-term debt that matures within one year, is positively correlated with the readability and specificity of risk disclosures. This relationship is stronger for firms that have greater concerns over refinancing risk and for firms operating in environments with lower proprietary disclosure costs. In addition, we show that high-quality risk disclosures can help firms mitigate refinancing risk by reducing the cost of future debt financing. Our study extends the current literature on risk disclosures and enhances the understanding of how refinancing risk shapes corporate disclosures.

Using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010, we explore a comprehensive set of board characteristics (size, composition and functioning of the board) and analyze their impacts on bank performance and bank asset quality in China. We find that the number of board meetings and the proportion of independent directors have significantly positive impacts on both bank performance and asset quality while board size has a significantly negative impact on bank performance. We find new evidence that the degree of bank boards’ political connection is negatively correlated with bank performance and asset quality. The findings suggest that the board of directors plays a significant role in bank governance in China.

This paper investigates whether banks value the presence of prosocial CEOs when designing loan contracts. Using personal charitable donation behavior to identify prosocial CEOs, we find robust evidence that the presence of prosocial CEOs is negatively related to firms' cost of debt. We address endogeneity concerns by employing a difference-in-differences setting that exploits exogenous CEO turnover events. Moreover, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs mitigates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby reduces the agency cost of debt. In addition, we find that the effect of prosocial CEOs also extends to non-price loan contract terms. Finally, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs has positive implications for firm value and is associated with lower default risk.

Dual holders, financial institutions that simultaneously hold the debt and equity claims of the same firms, increase corporate tax avoidance. The positive effect is more pronounced in firms with greater ex-ante risk-taking managerial incentives and higher short-term investor ownership. We also find that tax avoidance is associated with a lower cost of debt in the presence of dual holders. We suggest that after-tax awards are a mechanism through which dual holders influence corporate tax strategies. The evidence demonstrates that dual holding increases tax avoidance through mitigating shareholder–creditor conflicts. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and alternative tax avoidance measures.

We examine foreign lenders’ use of performance pricing provisions (PPPs) in syndicated loan contracts. First, we find that foreign lenders, as a result of both higher information asymmetry and greater renegotiation costs than their domestic counterparts, adopt PPPs instead of tight covenants in their contracts. Second, foreign lenders have a greater preference for PPPs based on credit ratings as opposed to those based on accounting ratios than their domestic counterparts. This is consistent with informationally disadvantaged foreign lenders valuing rating-based PPPs’ signaling role, with the role of accounting-based PPPs addressing the hold-up problem being less relevant to them. In addition, the above effects mainly exist when foreign lenders serve as participants rather than lead arrangers in the syndicate. Overall, our findings establish the important role played by rating-based PPPs in addressing foreign participant lenders’ information asymmetry and thereby promoting cross-border lending.

This study examines the effects of trade liberalization on municipal financing costs. Using the granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China as an exogenous shock, we find that U.S. counties that are more exposed to trade liberalization issue bonds with significantly higher tax-adjusted yield spreads. Moreover, these counties pay higher gross spreads and are less likely to issue bonds after PNTR. We also show that secondary market yield spreads increase significantly in response to the U.S. granting of PNTR to China. In addition, we provide evidence that a reduction in debt serving capacity serves as a channel underlying the trade shock effects. Our findings highlight the costs of trade liberalization for public finance.