This study tests the efficiency wage hypothesis by estimating wage and quit equations with data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey of firms. An efficiency wage model is derived that predicts effects of turnover costs and unemployment on wages as functions of first and second derivatives from the quit equation. The model is tested by examining the relationships between the coefficients in the wage and quit equations; the results are generally favorable to efficiency wage theory. Other important findings are that firm characteristics raising workers' productivity tend to raise wages and that a rise in turnover costs reduces quits.

This article presents estimates of the elasticity of supply of labor to child care. This parameter is an important determinant of the effects of child care subsidies and regulations on the cost of child care. Using data from the Current Population Survey, there is evidence of an elasticity in the range of 1.2-1.9. This implies that the majority of the benefits of child care subsidies accrue to consumers of child care. It is also consistent with the fact that child care workers' wages remained flat in real terms in recent years, despite rapid growth in the demand for child care.

Using union contract and industry wage survey data, this article examines the effect of discounting on cooperative bargaining behavior by unions and firms. Game theory predicts that higher discount rates raise the temptation to defect from cooperation. Measures of cooperative behavior included the presence of merit pay, incentive pay, wage-employment guarantees, or labor-management study committees. Discount rates were proxied by the relevant industry's failure rate. Failure rates generally had negative effects on cooperation. Industry Wage Survey results showed larger effects for union than non-union establishments, providing support for the union bargaining framework.

This paper incorporates a model of corporate control into a general equilibrium framework for production economies with incomplete markets. The classical objective of value maximization is extended, but is indeterminate. Instead, firms are viewed as being subject to shareholder control via some decision mechanism. As long as this decision mechanism is responsive to a unanimous preference by shareholders, shareholder control is consistent with but stronger than value maximization. Next, the particular institution of majority voting by shareholders is examined. It is shown that for generic economies, a majority rule equilibrium for a firm implies that production is optimal for the largest, or dominant, shareholder. Finally, a more realistic control mechanism is considered in which majority voting by shareholders is constrained by a group of shareholders, or Board of Directors, who control the voting agenda. The result is that shareholders not on the Board have no influence on the equilibrium production choice of the firm.

We argue that since bank loans and publicly traded sub-investment-grade debt, or junk bonds, are close substitutes for one another, the recent failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert created a competitive opportunity for commercial banks. Consistent with this hypothesis, we observe within the commercial banking industry a positive wealth effect associated with Drexel′s failure. The distribution of the wealth effect across commercial banks and Drexel′s investment banking rivals is consistent with the wealth effect being primarily a reflection of market expectations of a return to traditional intermediated funding of sub-investment-grade debt. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G2, Financial Institutions and Services.

Price deviations from basic valuation models based on accounting earnings and book value of owners' equity are used to test the intrinsic value explanation of the price‐earnings and price‐book value anomalies. Relative price deviations from the implied benchmark prices are used to assign years into high and low deviation groups. Traditional zero investment hedge portfolios are formed in each year, and the returns are compared across high and low deviation years. The high deviation years show significantly larger size‐ and risk‐adjusted returns over four holding periods, providing strong evidence in favor of an intrinsic value explanation of the anomalies. The findings also indicate that the test periods chosen for earlier studies can play a role in the results generated. Résumé. Les auteurs utilisent les écarts de prix dérivés des modèles d'évaluation de base fondés sur les bénéfices comptables et la valeur comptable des capitaux propres pour vérifier l'explication des anomalies relevées dans les rapports cours‐bénéfice et cours‐valeur comptable, qui repose sur la valeur intrinsèque. Les écarts relatifs des cours par rapport aux cours de référence implicites sont utilisés par les auteurs pour classer les années selon la nature élevée ou faible des écarts. Pour chaque année sont constitués des portefeuilles traditionnels dont les placements ne font l'objet d'aucune couverture, et les rendements sont soumis à une comparaison combinée des années présentant des écarts élevés et faibles. Les années présentant un écart élevé affichent des rendements supérieurs et ajustés pour tenir compte du risque au cours de quatre périodes de détention, ce qui milite clairement en faveur de l'explication des anomalies reposant sur la valeur intrinsèque. Les résultats indiquent également que les périodes de test choisies dans les études antérieures peuvent avoir influé sur les résultats obtenus.