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Economic Distress, Financial Distress, and Dynamic Liquidation

Journal of Finance 2002 57(1), 135-168
Many firms emerging from a debt restructuring remain highly leveraged, continue to invest little, perform poorly, and often reenter financial distress. The existing literature interprets these findings as inefficiencies arising from coordination problems among many creditors or an inefficient design of bankruptcy law. In contrast, this paper emphasizes that creditors lack the information that is needed to make quick and correct liquidation decisions. It can explain the long‐term nature of financial distress solely as the result of dynamic learning strategies of creditors and suggests that it may be an unavoidable byproduct of an efficient resolution of financial distress.

Blockholder Scarcity, Takeovers, and Ownership Structures

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2008 43(4), 937-974
Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.” We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,” is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.

Paper millionaires: how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it?

Journal of Financial Economics 2003 67(3), 385-410
Many firms have stockholders who face severe restrictions on their ability to sell their shares and diversify the risk of their personal wealth. We study the costs of these liquidity restrictions on stockholders using a continuous-time portfolio choice framework. These restrictions have major effects on the optimal investment and consumption strategies because of the need to hedge the illiquid stock position and smooth consumption in anticipation of the eventual lapse of the restrictions. These results provide a number of important insights about the effects of illiquidity in financial markets.

Short‐Term Debt as Bridge Financing: Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Journal of Finance 2015 70(1), 211-255
We analyze why firms use nonintermediated short‐term debt by studying the commercial paper (CP) market. Using a comprehensive database of CP issuers and issuance activity, we show that firms use CP to provide start‐up financing for capital investment. Firms’ CP issuance is driven by a desire to minimize transaction costs associated with raising capital for new investment. We show that firms with high rollover risk are less likely to enter the CP market, borrow less CP, and borrow more from bank credit lines. Further, CP is often refinanced with long‐term bond issuance to reduce rollover risk.