In Raising Keynes: A Twenty-First Century General Theory, Stephen A. Marglin offers a provocative reformulation of Keynes’ theoretical framework, stressing the importance of modeling the dynamics of wage and price adjustment. This review explains and assesses Marglin’s argument for the possibility of a persistent equilibrium in which goods and/or labor markets continue not to clear in the absence of active stabilization policy. It also compares Marglin’s analysis with that of New Keynesian models, and shows that the two approaches are more similar than might be immediately evident.

This paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions. It shows, in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector behaviour, that assignment of an interest-rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable, even when reduction of the magnitude of interest-rate changes is not a social objective in itself. This is because a response of policy to “irrelevant” lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private-sector expectations of future policy.

An adaptive learning rule is exhibited for the Azariadis (1981) overlapping generations model of a monetary economy with multiple equilibria, under which the economy may converge to a stationary equilibrium, even if agents do not initially believe that outcomes are significantly different in different sunspot states. The learning rule studied is of the stochastic approximation form studied by H. Robbins and S. Monro (1951); methods for analyzing the convergence of this form of algorithm are presented that may be of use in many other contexts as well. Conditions are given under which convergence to a equilibrium occurs with probability one. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

The challenge for stabilization policy presented by the COVID-19 pandemic stems above all from disruption of the circular flow of payments, resulting in a failure of what Keynes (1936) calls “effective demand.” As a consequence, economic activity in many sectors can be inefficiently low, and interest-rate policy cannot eliminate the distortions—not because of a limit on the extent to which interest rates can be reduced, but because interest-rate reductions fail to stimulate demand of the right sorts. Fiscal transfers are instead well suited to addressing the fundamental problem, and can under certain circumstances achieve a first-best allocation of resources.

A model is proposed in which stochastic choice results from noise in cognitive processing rather than random variation in preferences. The mental process used to make a choice is nonetheless optimal, subject to a constraint on available information-processing capacity that is motivated by neurophysiological evidence. The optimal information-constrained model is found to offer a better fit to experimental data on choice frequencies and reaction times than either a purely mechanical process model of choice (the drift-diffusion model) or an optimizing model with fewer constraints on feasible choice processes (the rational inattention model).

The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed.

How do people record information about the outcomes they observe in their environment? Building on a well-established neuroscientific framework, we propose a model in which people are hampered in their perception of outcomes that they expect to seldom encounter. We provide experimental evidence for such “outlier blindness” and discuss how it provides a microfoundation for neglected tail risk by investors in financial markets.

The authors construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed-on pricing path. They use methods similar to those of F. Kydland and E. Prescott (1982) to calibrate linearized versions of both their model and an analogous perfectly concerning model. The authors then compute the two models' predictions concerning the economy's responses to a change in military spending. The responses predicted by the oligopolistic model are closer to the empirical responses estimated with postwar U.S. data than the corresponding predictions of the competitive model.

This paper provides a fairly systematic study of general economic conditions under which rational asset pricing bubbles may arise in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium framework.Our main results are concerned with non-existence of asset pricing bubbles in those economies.These results imply that the conditions under which bubbles are possible inc1uding sorne well-known examples of monetary equilibria-are relatively fragile.