We study a structural model of individual bank defaults across the banking sector; banks are interconnected through their exposure to a common risk factor. The paper introduces a systemic risk measure based on the default frequency in the banking sector; this measure depends non-linearly on the factor's loadings, in contrast to previous systemic risk measures that depend linearly on loadings. We estimate loadings in the U.S. banking system over the course of the last 36 years; we find that they have considerably increased over time and identify four major regimes. Our measure shows that systemic risk became critical in the last of our four regimes, covering the most recent time period from 05/2007 to 09/2016. The empirical findings highlight that our measure complements existing systemic risk measures.

This paper describes how managers attempt to motivate subordinate cooperation through the actions they take to apply controls and build trust. Results obtained from interviews and a survey of practicing managers detail how managers work to motivate particular types of subordinate cooperation using specific forms of control and demonstrations of their trustworthiness. These results also indicate that relationships between the forms of cooperation managers seek to promote and their demonstrations of trustworthiness are mediated by the controls they apply. Three relationships are identified in this study. Managers' applications of results controls mediate the relationship between their desires to motivate superior-subordinate work coordination and their demonstrations of reliability; 2. Managers' applications of action controls mediate the relationship between their desires to motivate subordinate job engagement and their demonstrations of competence; 3. Managers' applications of personnel controls mediate the relationship between their desires to motivate positive interpersonal relationships with their subordinates and their demonstrations of benevolence. These findings advance our knowledge of fundamental relationships in control-trust dynamics by presenting observations of managers' trust-building activities, displaying how managers' trust-building activities are related to the controls they apply, and delineating how managers attempt to motivate subordinate cooperation through applications of particular forms of controls and demonstrations of their trustworthiness.

Investment spending by US public firms is highly concentrated. The 100 largest spenders account for 60% of total capital expenditures and drive most of the variation in aggregate investment. This high concentration creates a disconnect between the average public firm and macroeconomic aggregates. For large firms, cash flow remains the primary driver of investment spending and has not declined in importance as it has for smaller public firms. The cash flowing to big spenders provides a better forecast of future investment opportunities than noisy proxies for Tobin's q even though these firms are not financially constrained. These results suggest that, at least for the largest spenders, it is unlikely that measurement error drives the significance of cash flow. Our results are also inconsistent with recent models that predict higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for small young growth firms and suggest that cash flow is still the most important determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations in investment spending.

Using international listed banks from the United States, Europe, Japan and China from 2004 to 2014, we analyze the effect on banks’ risk of some of the most relevant new elements of the prudential regulatory framework proposed after the Financial Crisis. We measure risk by a market measure, the volatility of banks’ stock returns. We also examine the effect of government support during the financial crisis and designation as a G-SIB. We find little support for an association with government support and none for a negative relationship. We find support for a positive effect of designation as a G-SIB on risk. We find a positive association with securities trading and a negative association with capital. Banks´ chosen liquidity is unimportant for this measure of risk.

Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors’ expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect. In a second order approximation of the model, conditional welfare analysis shows that a policy of immediate leniency followed by harsher terms as the economy grows is beneficial to both creditors and debtors.

Promotion decisions for professors are critical for any university and this is especially true when promotion also involves the granting of tenure. In this paper, we report the number of publications for Finance professors promoted to Associate or Full Professor at schools similar to the University of Georgia and also at the Top 10 Finance Departments. We also provide evidence on citations of the individuals' research. Our data reveal similarities in terms of the total number of articles published (between 6 and 8 for promotion to Associate Professor), the number of articles published in Finance “A” journals (about 3), and the number of citations between peer and aspirant schools. We find evidence that Associate Professors at Top 10 Departments have slightly more “A” articles and receive more citations to their work than those at lower ranked institutions. We find similar results for those promoted to Full Professor – similar publication records but with more “A” publications and citations for those in Top 10 Departments. Our paper provides up-to-date information on some of the factors considered for promotion of Finance professors. However, the much more difficult part of promotion decisions is determining the impact of past research and the potential for future contributions. In addition, teaching, service, and other departmental contributions are key to the promotion decision.

This study examines the effect of litigation risk and litigation costs on firms’ credit ratings and debt financing. The results show that litigation affects a firm's creditworthiness and debt costs in two stages. Before a lawsuit filing, firms at higher risk of litigation have lower credit ratings, are more likely to be rated speculative grade, pay higher yields on loans and bonds, and are less likely to rely on debt financing. At the time of the lawsuit resolution, settlement costs have an additional effect on firm credit quality. Companies facing larger settlement disbursements in relation to their available cash experience a decline in credit ratings and an increase in yield spread. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns and different proxies of litigation risk.