In an environment where concentrated share ownership is the norm, we ask whether Majority-of-the-Minority (MoM) votes curb controlling shareholder overreach and investment inefficiency. We consider MoM votes on controller-based related party transactions in China. Such votes give minority parties potential veto power. We report strong association between shareholder disapprovals on controller-based investment related MoM proposals and the underlying entity's investment plans. This association is robust to a battery of tests, including assessment of pre-vote consultation between minority and controlling shareholders and an exogenous regulatory shock. We also report increased likelihood of informal securities enforcements in the year following MoM shareholder disapproval.

The present research enterprise addresses the efficacy of securities enforcement in China in relation to listed firms' restatement of annual reports. We conjecture that securities enforcement induces greater care and prudence in disclosure, thus lessening the prospect of subsequent restatement. The evidence in the present inquiry strongly supports this premise. Our focus is on informal enforcements. Significantly, SOEs are more responsive than non-SOEs in arresting reporting deficiencies. In contrast to a narrative of regulatory capture, SOE decision-makers' political connections cement, rather than deter, compliance with state-based enforcements. Additionally, the two mainland exchanges impart stronger effect on disclosure quality than either central or local security bureaus. In relation to governance, independent directors exert little to no effect on year-on-year changes in restatement activities. Overall, we report that Chinese regulatory enforcement has become increasingly effective in raising disclosure standards. We surmise that learning and resource-based effects underlie this outcome.

The present study investigates the impact of a target entity’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) credentials, board diversity, and stock return synchronicity on analyst coverage decisions. Based on more than 33,000 stock recommendations on UK listed companies, we significantly deepen and extend the relevant literature (Kumar, 2010; Li et al, 2013; and Li et al., 2024) in several important ways. We find female analysts are more likely than male analysts to impound CSR information into stock coverage decisions for entities with intermediate recommendations. For firms with more extreme economic prospects. i.e., at strong buy and sell levels, the positive effect of CSR performance on female analyst coverage weakens. After controlling for the CSR characteristics of a stock, results suggest female analysts are more likely to cover firms with gender-inclusive boards. Results accord with a narrative emphasizing female analysts’ weaker access to firms with less gender-inclusive boards. Our account adds new context and application to the emerging corporate finance literature on gender-based homophily. Finally, we report limited difference in the stock return synchronicity of firms covered by male and female analysts.

We develop a non-linear Markov error correction approach to examine the general co-integration relation between the H- and A-prices of cross-listed Chinese stock issuers across the period January 1999 to March 2009. We unravel three important dimensions of this relation. These pertain to (i) the long-run expectation of the H- (to A-price) discount; (ii) the level of short-run co-movement in prices; and (iii) the magnitude of error corrections. Findings point to significant improvements in all three areas. Policy and corporate governance change appears to be the principal force driving the efficiency gains. Weakening informational asymmetries underlie much of the change in the markets’ relative pricing. In contrast, sentiment effects strongly underpin the contemporaneous response and error correction adjustments. Finally, the escalating Global Financial Crisis of 2008 appears to have not only bolstered the A- and H-markets’ short-term pricing dynamic but also temporarily increased the long-term H-share discount.