Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.

This is the first study to examine both how well plan administrators select funds for 401(k) plans and how participants react to plan administrator decisions. We find that, on average, administrators select funds that outperform randomly selected funds of the same type although they do not outperform index funds of the same type. When administrators change offerings, they choose funds that did well in the past, but, after the change, added funds do no better than dropped funds. Plan participants in aggregate change their allocation decisions in a way that accentuates the changes in allocation caused by returns. The change in allocation due to the investment of new money and interfund transfers is about the same size, and in the same direction, as the change due to returns. Participant allocations in aggregate do no better than naïve allocation rules, such as equal investment in each offering.

We use internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures prior to mandated internal control audits to investigate economic factors that expose firms to control failures and managements’ incentives to discover and report control problems. We find that, relative to non-disclosers, firms disclosing ICDs have more complex operations, recent organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations and have fewer resources available for internal control. Regarding incentives to discover and report internal control problems, ICD firms have more prior SEC enforcement actions and financial restatements, are more likely to use a dominant audit firm, and have more concentrated institutional ownership.

We examine 12-month returns following disclosure of first-time going concern (GC) opinions in the U.S. and Australia. We find no evidence of significant negative abnormal returns associated with GC opinions in Australia. In the U.S., negative abnormal returns subsequent to GC opinions are sensitive to choice of expected returns—notably, there are no significant negative abnormal returns when using factor models or after controlling for momentum. Overall, contrary to Taffler, Lu, Kausar's [2004. In denial? Stock market underreaction to going-concern audit report disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 263–285.] U.K. results, we are unable to document a market anomaly in the U.S. or Australia associated with GC opinions.

Standard asset pricing models assume that: (i) there is complete agreement among investors about probability distributions of future payoffs on assets; and (ii) investors choose asset holdings based solely on anticipated payoffs; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods. Both assumptions are unrealistic. We provide a simple framework for studying how disagreement and tastes for assets as consumption goods can affect asset prices.

Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: The entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets.

We experimentally examine determinants of the transferability and durability of an assurer's flagship-service reputation for competence in a multi-service context. Economic and psychology theories agree that transferability will increase when a new service and a flagship service require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. These theories disagree, however, regarding the durability of an assurer's flagship-service reputation following a performance failure in a new service. Economic theory requires some reciprocity for transferability and durability, and, accordingly, predicts that a new-service failure will inflict more damage on a flagship-service reputation when the new and flagship services require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. Psychology theory, in contrast, predicts that a new-service failure will tend not to damage the flagship-service reputation, even when the new and flagship services require relatively similar competencies. Thus, unlike economic theory, psychology theory predicts that relatively similar competencies between a new and a flagship service can improve the transferability of an assurer's flagship-service reputation for competence without reciprocally threatening its durability. Experimental findings indicate that reputation transferability increases when the new and flagship services require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. They also indicate that a new-service failure damages the flagship-service reputation only when, and to a greater degree when, the new and flagship services require relatively dissimilar, as opposed to relatively similar, competencies. Thus, empirically, greater similarity in the competencies required by a new and flagship service simultaneously enhances the transferability and durability of the assurer's flagship-service reputation. These empirical findings are better explained by psychology theory than by economic theory.

We use administrative data from Missouri to examine the sensitivity of earnings impact estimates for a job training program based on alternative nonexperimental methods. We consider regression adjustment, Mahalanobis distance matching, and various methods using propensity-score matching, examining both cross-sectional estimates and difference-in-difference estimates. Specification tests suggest that the difference-in-difference estimator may provide a better measure of program impact. We find that propensity-score matching is most effective, but the detailed implementation is not of critical importance. Our analyses demonstrate that existing data can be used to obtain useful estimates of program impact.