Berk and Green (2004) make a theoretical argument that performance persistence should not exist since new money flows into well-performing mutual funds and there are diseconomies of scale, or because successful funds capture excess returns by raising fees. We find that performance prediction continues when we examine samples of larger and larger funds and that past performance predicts future performance for holding periods up to three years. Funds that outperform index funds of the same risk can be identified. We find that expense ratios are lower for large funds, and decrease as funds get larger or perform well.

The paper demonstrates that a real options structural model of borrower-creditor debt re-negotiations can help explain the cross-sectional variability of losses on defaulted debt securities. The explanatory power of this approach can be improved even further via a system of equations that incorporates additional information by jointly estimating the market values of debt and equity. Empirical tests with a large number of corporate defaults confirm the usefulness of this method. Moreover, higher volatility and lower discount rates around business cycle turning points can result in stakeholders waiting relatively longer for additional returns from defaulted debt. Such optimal stopping behavior based on a real options model mitigates the reduction in face value of debt but can prolong the duration of financial distress.

I describe household behavior in boom and bust economic cycles with a particular focus on the recent financial crisis. The behaviors are motivated by cognitive limitations and psychological bias. In boom times, households’ extrapolation bias and groupthink lead to chasing and extending asset bubbles (like tech stocks and real estate). Increasing use of debt spurs the economy and eventually overburdens households. In bust times, the biases and fear lead to selling previously popular assets at low prices. Households generally respond to bust times by spending less, repaying debt and saving more, which drags on an already slow economy. In addition, households influence businesses and governments into actions during the cycle. In the recent boom, predatory lenders preyed on cognitive limitations and biases of subprime borrowers to sell them high cost mortgages that they would not be able to repay. Another contributing factor is that during boom times, household attention is not focused on financial regulation. This is when business influences the political process and laws are enacted to loosen market regulation. These changes may extend the boom period into bubble territory. During bust times, public outcry influences politicians to tighten business regulation, likely inhibiting the economic rebound. Thus, household behavior plays an important role in economic boom/bust cycles.

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were extensions of credit by the New York Clearing House to its members. These certificates were transferable to other clearing house members as a form of final payment for settlement of interbank payments. The certificate issues allowed borrowing banks to maintain (and increase) loans, fulfill cash payment upon depositor withdrawal demands, and enabled gold imports, which took two to three weeks to arrive. The large, New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearing House issuing) a volume of clearing house loan certificates in excess of their own immediate liquidity needs, in accord with their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.

In contrast to the widely held belief that targets capture the lion's share of merger gains, I show that the average dollar gains to targets are only modestly more than the dollar gains to acquirers. To help explain the variation in merger outcomes, I present empirical evidence in support of a new hypothesis that a target's relative scarcity (proxied by its market power) and product market dependence (proxied by customer–supplier relations) help to explain its share of the total merger gains. These results provide new evidence for an unexplored role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers.

This study examines whether the information content of earnings announcements – abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume – increases in countries following mandatory IFRS adoption, and conditions and mechanisms through which increases occur. Findings suggest information content increased in 16 countries that mandated adoption of IFRS relative to 11 that maintained domestic accounting standards, although the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption depends on the strength of legal enforcement in the adopting country. Utilizing a path analysis methodology, we find evidence of three mechanisms through which IFRS adoption increases information content: reducing reporting lag, increasing analyst following, and increasing foreign investment.

In Poor Economics, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo eschew grand theorizing about poverty reduction in favor of an approach in which intelligently designed and tested small interventions, based on a scientific understanding of the lives of the poor, marginally improve their welfare. In so doing, they describe the findings from the recent large literature describing the behavior and institutions of the poor and the consequences of policy and experimental interventions targeted to poverty populations. In this review, I assess whether “thinking small” with its associated policy regime of transfers, subsidies, and nudges, is both a practical and effective policy prescription for “fighting” poverty and whether the set of studies that have focused on populations that have not escaped poverty has improved our fundamental understanding of both the consequences and causes of poverty.

Previous studies of the U.S. Great Depression find that increased government spending and taxation contributed little to either the dramatic downturn or the slow recovery. These studies include only one type of capital taxation: a business profits tax. The contribution is much greater when the analysis includes other types of capital taxes. A general equilibrium model extended to include taxes on dividends, property, capital stock, excess profits, and undistributed profits predicts patterns of output, investment, and hours worked that are more like those in the 1930s than found in earlier studies. The greatest effects come from the increased taxes on corporate dividends and undistributed profits.