We employ corporate takeover decisions to investigate the impact of institutional ownership on corporate performance. The OLS regressions of bidder gains on institutional ownership indicate a positive relation between the two. However, we find institutional ownership to be significantly determined by firm size, insider ownership and the firm's presence in the S&P 500 index. Thus, when bidder gains are regressed on the predicted values of institutional ownership in two-stage regressions, the recursive estimates do not confirm the relationship shown by the OLS regressions. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence that active institutional investors (e.g., CalPERS) as a group enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control. These findings cast doubt on the superior selection/monitoring abilities of institutional investors.

Rakesh Basant, Brian Fikkert, The Effects of R&D, Foreign Technology Purchase, and Domestic and International Spillovers on Productivity in Indian Firms, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 187-199

Rakesh Vohra of University of Pennsylvania reviews “The Everything Token: How NFTs and Web3 Will Transform the Way We Buy, Sell, and Create” by Steve Kaczynski and Scott Duke Kominers. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores how non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are changing the way that business is done, demonstrating the role and inevitability of NFT technology in everyday life.”

Rakesh V. Vohra of University of Pennsylvania reviews, “Jane Austen, Game Theorist” by Michael Suk-Young Chwe. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the ways in which the core ideas of game theory appear in Jane Austen's novels. Discusses the argument; game theory in context; folk tales and human rights; game theory in Flossie and the Fox; Austen's six novels; Austen's foundations of game theory; Austen's competing models; Austen on what strategic thinking is not; Austen's innovations; Austen on strategic thinking's disadvantages; Austen's intentions; Austen on cluelessness; and real-world cluelessness. Chwe is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.”

Centralized markets reduce search for buyers and sellers. Their “thickness” increases the chance of order execution at nearly competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to consolidate, some markets, securities markets and on‐line advertising being the most notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is an inevitable feature of any centralized market except in special circumstances.

Anscombe and Aumann showed that if one accepts the existence of a physical randomizing device such as a roulette wheel then Savage's derivation of subjective expected utility can be considerably simplified. They, however, invoked compound gambles to define their axioms. We demonstrate that the subjective expected utility derivation can be further simplified and need not invoke compound gambles. Our simplification is obtained by closely following the steps by which probabilities and utilities are elicited.

Consider a weather forecaster predicting a probability of rain for the next day. We consider tests that, given a finite sequence of forecast predictions and outcomes, will either pass or fail the forecaster. Sandroni showed that any test which passes a forecaster who knows the distribution of nature can also be probabilistically passed by a forecaster with no knowledge of future events. We look at the computational complexity of such forecasters and exhibit a linear-time test and distribution of nature such that any forecaster without knowledge of the future who can fool the test must be able to solve computationally difficult problems. Thus, unlike Sandroni's work, a computationally efficient forecaster cannot always fool this test independently of nature.

This paper provides an extension of Savage's subjective expected utility theory for decisions under uncertainty. It includes in the set of events both unambiguous events for which probabilities are additive as well as ambiguous events for which probabilities are permitted to be nonadditive. The main axiom is cumulative dominance which adapts stochastic dominance to decision making under uncertainty. We derive a Choquet expected utility representation and show that a modification of cumulative dominance leads to the classical expected utility representation. The relationship of our approach with that of Schmeidler who uses a two-stage formulation to derive Choquet expected utility is also explored.

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two.