Possible explanations are provided for two basic results in Kräussl's paper. First, rating effect may be stronger in emerging markets because they are less transparent. Transparency is interpreted in the context of Knightian uncertainty and institutional quality. Emerging markets have lower institutional quality ratings and present greater uncertainty than mature markets, therefore, they are more susceptible to rating agencies’ evaluations. Some empirical evidence on the correlations between institutional quality rankings and portfolio investment is presented. Second, sovereign credit downgrades generate a stronger market reaction than upgrades because decision makers value losses more than gains, as posited by cumulative prospect theory.

Previous work by Aggarwal and Samwick [Aggarwal, R., Samwick, A., 1999. The other side of the tradeoff: the impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107 pp. 65–105] has documented the importance of controlling for the variance of firm stock returns when estimating pay–performance sensitivities. They find that pay–performance sensitivities are an order of magnitude greater for small vs. large variance firms. Using a comparable sample of CEOs, I provide evidence that when properly controlling for firm size, the negative effect of variance in stock returns on estimated pay–performance sensitivities is greatly diminished. In particular, when using dollar returns as the measure of firm performance, it is imperative to properly control for firm size.

Predictability of future returns using ex ante information (e.g., analyst forecasts) violates market efficiency. We show that predictability can be due to non-random data deletion, especially in skewed distributions of long-horizon security returns. Passive deletion arises because some firms do not survive the post-event long horizon. Active deletion arises when extreme observations are truncated by the researcher. Simulations demonstrate that data deletion induces a negative relation between future returns and ex ante information variables. Analysis of actual data suggests a 30–50% bias in the estimated relations. We recommend specific robustness checks when testing return predictability using ex ante information.

Using data from the 1998 proxy season, we find that higher levels of potential dilution from management-sponsored, executive-only stock option plans result in significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day period surrounding the proxy date. We also present evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the percentage vote against the option proposal and the percentage change in executive pay from the 1998 to 1999 compensation years. We interpret this finding to support the idea that boards of directors are responsive to shareholder concerns about CEO option awards following a high level of shareholder opposition.

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.

We present and test an infinite-horizon, continuous-time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust the use of risk management instruments which seek to reduce product price uncertainty and thereby mitigate financial distress losses and reduce taxes. The dynamic setting relaxes several restrictive assumptions common to static models. In the model, the firm can adjust its use and the hedge ratio and maturity of risk management instruments over time, risk management instruments expire as time progresses, the available maturity of the risk management instruments is shorter than the lifetime of the firm, and transaction costs are associated with initiation and adjustment of risk management contracts. The model produces a number of new time-series and cross-sectional implications on how firms use short-term instruments to hedge long-term cash flow uncertainty. Numerical results describe the optimal timing, adjustment, and rollover of risk management instruments and the choice of contract maturity and hedge ratio in response to changes in the firm's product price. The results show that the structure of transaction costs can have an important effect on the firm's risk management strategy. The model predicts that firms that are either far from financial distress or deep in financial distress neither initiate nor adjust their risk management instruments, while firms between the two extremes initiate and actively adjust their risk management instruments. Using quarterly panel data on gold mining firms between 1993 and 1999, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between measures of financial distress and risk management activity consistent with the model. We also provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions with respect to the maturity choice of risk management contracts.