We provide evidence that investors with leverage constraints demand leverage for the sake of leverage. We study the equity closed-end fund (CEF) market and document a strong positive relation between fund leverage and CEF premiums, indicating that investors pay a relative premium for leverage. We perform a quasi-natural experiment and identify leverage as a causal driver of the premium. Leverage changes do not signal improved fund performance. Instead, the only benefit to investors of increased leverage is amplified exposure via greater volatility and risk exposure. We supply external validity by relating our results to the betting-against-beta factor.

A key question is why many multinational firms forgo foreign exchange derivative (FX) hedging and instead use operational hedging. We propose an explanation based on illiquidity and the unique advantages of operational hedges. We use 10-K filings to construct dynamically updated text-based measures of the offshore sale of output, purchase of input, and ownership of assets. We find that firms use FX derivatives when they are liquid and generally available. Otherwise, they often favor purchasing input from the same nations they sell output to, an operational hedge. Quasi-natural experiments based on new derivative product launches suggest a likely causal relation.

Speculative language in corporate disclosures can convey valuable information about firms’ fundamentals. We evaluate this idea by developing a measure for speculative statements based on sentences marked with the “weasel tag” on Wikipedia. In the 16-week test period after filing, greater use of speculative statements in 10-Ks predicts higher and nonreverting abnormal returns, more insider and informed buying, and higher news sentiment. These findings imply that managers’ usage of speculative language in 10-Ks reflects voluntary disclosure of their private information about the positive prospects of events when market implications of the events are uncertain and thus have room for (re)interpretation.

We examine the effects of Title I of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act for a sample of 312 emerging growth companies (EGCs) that filed for an initial public offering (IPO) from April 5, 2012 through April 30, 2015. We find no reduction in the direct costs of issuance, accounting, legal, or underwriting fees for EGC IPOs. Underpricing, an indirect cost of issuance that increases an issuer's cost of capital, is significantly higher for EGCs compared to other IPOs. More importantly, greater underpricing is present only for larger firms that are newly eligible for scaled disclosure under the Act. Overall, we find little evidence that the Act in its first three years has reduced the measurable costs of going public. Although there are benefits of the Act that issuers appear to value, they should be balanced against the higher costs of capital that can occur after its enactment.