This paper analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory capital buffers of German local banks in the period 1993–2004. The capital buffers are found to fluctuate countercyclically over the business cycle. The evidence supports that low-capitalized banks do not catch up with their well-capitalized peers over the observation period and they do not decrease risk-weighted assets during a recession. This finding suggests that their low capitalization does not force them to retreat from lending.

We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance.