Abstract This paper analyzes seven mandated disclosures contained in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) to assess their information content. Generally, the results show that certain MD&A disclosures, particularly the discussions of future operations and planned capital expenditures, are associated with future (short-term) performance measures and investment decisions, after control- ling for information contained in financial-statement-based ratios. However, the associations with longer-term results are generally not significant. The study illustrates that, in conjunction with the financial statements, the MD&A disclosures, especially prospective disclosures, can assist in assessing firms' future (short-term) prospects.

This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996–2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions.

Contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity but may exacerbate the agency problems of debt. We present evidence that the agency costs of debt may have declined during the 1990s. Specifically, changes in the financial characteristics of our sample firms suggest that underinvestment, asset substitution, and financial distress became less likely. Furthermore, agency costs of equity increased during the 1990s, primarily because firms became more difficult to monitor. Together, the findings provide an explanation for why more firms used option-based compensation in the latter 1990s, and why the proportion of options in compensation structure increased throughout the decade of the 1990s.