Markets for many real assets are characterized by sequential search followed by bilateral bargaining between matched buyers and sellers. For a category of real assets, the joint, intertemporal valuation problems of buyers, owners, and sellers, and the associated Nash pricing function are solved explicitly. In equilibrium, the average transaction price is a noisy, proportional random walk, and the liquidity premium is positive for matched owners. Depending on the values of the parameters, the liquidity premium can be substantial. In a related problem of optimal development with costly search, the optimal exercise point, cost of development, and value of the undeveloped asset are calculated analytically. With search, development can occur sooner and undeveloped assets have lower market values than the standard solution without search.

A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is characterized for an industry with dissipative costs of agency. In sequence, firms can enter the industry, raise capital with external debt and/or equity, invest in a capital-intensive technology or dissipate capital in perquisites, and finally produce output. For plausible values of two critical parameters, some firms forego in equilibrium investments with positive net present values. Although more managers would like their firms to invest in the capital-intensive technology, they cannot raise the required cash in the capital market. In equilibrium, the industry can have both a profitable core of large, secure, capital-intensive firms, with some debt but no unique optimal capital structure, and a competitive fringe of small, risky, labor-intensive firms. Even as the cost of entry converges to zero, capital-intensive firms can earn extraordinary profits, while all labor-intensive firms fail. With costly agency, access to capital can become a barrier to entry.

Mean and variance measures of health information about cholesterol and saturated fat are included in a demand system for fats and oils. A Bayesian model of health risk belief and consumer awareness surveys are the basis for computing these measures. The empirical demand model shows that health information has resulted in significant increases in consumption for corn, cottonseed, and soybean oils and decreased consumption for butter and lard. The predicted demand effects based on the Bayesian information model are more reasonable than predictions from using either a time trend or a simple cumulative cholesterol information index.

This paper provides a comprehensive treatment of a basic income maintenance problem for a group of individuals who differ in their income generating abilities. It stresses the impact that imperfect information about such abilities has on programme design. The analysis serves two purposes. First, we are able to unify the theoretical literature on the income maintenance problem. Second, we examine the impact of allowing the government to impose workfare on recipients of income support. In addition to being of policy interest, this is a theoretically challenging problem since it requires solving a multi-dimensional screening problem. The solution that we find is strikingly simple. It separates the poor into two categories, with the lower income groups subject to workfare while facing a 100% marginal tax rate on earnings. The second group does no public work and is offered a benefit schedule which taxes earnings at a lower rate.

The paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the private demand for STD testing and for protection against infection with emphasis on testing for the AIDS virus (HIV) and on the effects of public subsidies for such testing on the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. We discuss the theoretical conditions under which subsidizing testing either increases or decreases disease incidence and provide evidence on the empirical significance of those conditions.

Just like economists, voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently. We model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs. In the long run, “left-wing dynasties” believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with “right-wing dynasties.” This allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries.

Occupational sex segregation and its relationship with wages during 1973-93 are examined. Wage level and wage change models are estimated using Current Population Survey data matched with measures of occupational skills and job disamenities. Standard analysis confirms that wage levels are substantially lower in predominantly female occupations. Gender composition effects are reduced by about a quarter for women and by over one-half for men following control for skill-related occupational characteristics. Longitudinal analysis indicates that two-thirds or more of the standard gender composition effect is accounted for by occupational characteristics and unmeasured worker skill or taste differences.