We examine whether the composition of top management with General Counsel (GC) affects properties of management earnings forecasts disclosures. After controlling for corporate governance and litigation risk, we find that firms with a GC in top management are more likely to issue forecasts, particularly bad news forecasts, than other firms. Further, their forecasts are less optimistic and more accurate than those issued by others. Consistently, the stock price reaction to their forecast news is stronger. These effects are more pronounced when the GC's managerial status is higher. Overall, our results suggest that GCs play an important role in corporate disclosures.

This article investigates the information content of signals about the identity of investors and their role in price formation. Whereas we document that investors use multiple brokers, broker identity is nevertheless a powerful signal about the identity of investors who initiate trades. The market also correctly processes this signal: the permanent price impact of orders coming from different brokers fits the information profile of the investors associated with these brokers. Our results suggest that an increase in the degree of anonymity may render order flow less informative, which could explain why the literature has documented liquidity improvements in exchanges that reduce transparency.

Using data from the 2000 census and the 2001-08 American Community Surveys, this paper examines the impact of 9/11 on the earnings of US veteran men. Our hypothesis is that the surge in patriotism after 9/11 improved their relative earnings, but this earnings effect was short-lived. In addition, we further consider whether this effect was equally felt across race/ethnicity and along regional dimensions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant short-term improvement in the relative earnings of US veteran men following 9/11. However, additional analyses suggest that this earnings effect did not evenly occur across demographic and geographic dimensions.

The value premium is relatively small for investors with a material fixed-income exposure, such as insurance companies and pension funds, especially when they are downside-risk-averse. Value stocks are less attractive to these investors because they offer a relatively poor hedge against poor bond returns. This result arises for plausible, medium-term evaluation horizons of around one year. Our findings cast doubt on the practical relevance of the value premium for these investors and reiterate the importance of the choice of the relevant test portfolio, risk measure and investment horizon in empirical tests of market portfolio efficiency.