Using variation in payday lending restrictions over time and across states, we study competition in the market for small, short-term consumer loans. We find that banks and credit unions reduce overdraft credit limits and prices when payday credit, a possible substitute, is prohibited. These findings suggest that depositories respond to payday loan bans by taking less risk, bouncing checks that they would have otherwise covered. The decline in overdraft prices is surprising when viewed in isolation, but sensible given that depositories incur lower credit losses as they limit overdraft coverage. We find some evidence that credit unions’ overdraft activities are more profitable when payday loans are prohibited, consistent with decreased competition. In addition to characterizing the impact of prohibiting payday lending, a common state policy change in recent years, our findings illuminate competition in the small-dollar loan market by highlighting the importance of non-price adjustments to credit offers.

We analyze the costs and benefits of clawback provisions that enable firms to recover incentive compensation from top management if financials are restated. In a simple contracting model, we find that a clawback provision effectively lengthens the horizon of incentives and curbs misreporting. However, such a provision can add noise to the underlying performance measure, reducing managerial effort and firm value. Our empirical tests support the model’s predictions regarding which types of firms are likely to voluntarily use clawback provisions. We also document that clawback provisions are associated with higher reporting quality, greater CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, and higher CEO compensation.

In a neo-canonical monetary policy model, targeting of nominal GDP in terms of growth rates (not growing levels) is analytically equivalent to adoption of a policy that is optimal from a “timeless perspective,” in the sense developed by Woodford and widely utilized in recent monetary policy analysis.

We provide evidence that existing studies relating financial condition to product market cooperation produce mixed results because of unique features of the industries examined. In particular, all evidence suggesting that poor financial condition decreases cooperation comes from the airline industry during periods of high idle capacity. Using a unique data set of aggregate airfare hikes and a more recent low-idle-capacity period, we find that poor financial condition is positively associated with product market cooperation. Although financially weak airlines appear to value the immediate cash flows of increased cooperation, only liquidity-constrained firms seem willing to incur the cost of cooperative attempts.

Financial relationships can alleviate the adverse effects of asymmetric information and agency costs on outside stakeholders. We examine announcement returns to PIPE transactions, conditional on the contract terms and identity of the investor. We find that the influence of contract terms on announcement returns depends on investor identity. For PIPEs with hedge fund investors, the inclusion of control terms associates with much larger announcement returns. In contrast, announcement returns for PIPEs, involving strategic investors, are less dependent on the existence of control terms. We find the opposite for liquidity terms. Namely, announcement returns are dramatically different for strategic investors with and without liquidity terms, while inclusion of liquidity terms is less influential when PIPEs involve hedge funds. Our findings suggest that investor identity and contract terms jointly influence market reactions to PIPEs.

Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk‐averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that would arise when all traders have constant risk tolerance. We show that these endogenously determined prices are inconsistent with the assumed prices in Verrecchia (1983) when the manager elects to not disclose. We derive the manager's disclosure strategy for our setting and extend the comparative static results in Verrecchia (1990) for risk‐neutral traders to a setting where traders have constant risk tolerance and prices are endogenously derived. Further, in our setting, discretionary disclosure does not affect how traders price risk of different outcomes. Also, we offer a representation of risk‐averse traders' prices using risk‐adjusted distributions. Finally, these results provide implications for empirical‐archival discretionary disclosure studies.

How and by how much do supervisors enhance worker productivity? Using a company-based data set on the productivity of technology-based services workers, we estimate supervisor effects and find them to be large. Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10% of boss quality with one who is in the upper 10% of boss quality increases a team’s total output by more than adding one worker to a nine-member team would. Workers assigned to better bosses are less likely to leave the firm. A separate normalization implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker.

We independently and jointly test multiple proposed explanations for chief executive officer (CEO) pay-for-luck asymmetry, comparing their contributions to the observed asymmetry. Measuring luck based on both stock and operating performance, we analyze pay asymmetry for both the average and median CEO. We document that favorable labor market opportunities—measuring executive retention concerns—most consistently underlie pay asymmetry across specifications, while CEO power and bankruptcy avoidance incentives are only weakly related. However, none of these independently explains pay asymmetry across our expanded tests. Our results highlight important empirical modeling concerns and provide valuable insight for future theoretical and empirical work.