This paper aims to provide a theoretical underpinning of the dynamic efficiency model pioneered by [Ahn, S.C., Good, D.H., Sickles, R.C., 2000. Estimation of long-run inefficiency levels: A dynamic frontier approach. Econometric Reviews 19, 461–492]. In the context of a quadratic loss function this paper formulates a multi-period forward-looking rational expectations model on the evolution of the technical inefficiency level, which correctly produces a dynamic panel data model. The model is illustrated using panel data of 112 French banks. Encouraging evidence of superiority in favor of the model is reached. Substantial cost inefficiency prevails in this industry, where the constituent banks are characterized as having volatile adjustment speeds toward their long-run steady states. The sample banks exhibit increasing returns to scale and product-mix economies.

The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.