This essay will discuss the criticisms of the economic approach to markets offered by Michael Sandel's What Money Can't Buy. After reviewing the main arguments, the essay looks at these from three main angles. First, it relates them to different traditions of thinking about markets and their achievements that have been developed by economists. Second, it discusses the idea that markets can change values as argued by Sandel in light of recent related literature in economics. Third, it discusses some of the literature on alternatives to using the market to allocate resources and the pros and cons of these. (JEL A11, A13, D40, D63, P10)

This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives. The author develops three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. The author investigates the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights. Finally, he suggests tests for which of the theories might explain the results. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Whether those who claim benefits should face a work requirement has been an issue of long-standing social concern. Important examples of schemes which require work are the Californian workfare program, Indian food security schemes and the English Poor Law of 1834. We present two arguments for demanding work for benefits: first, a work requirement can scree the truly needy from those who are not in need of support and second, it can provide incentives for people to invest in skills which enable them to avoid poverty. In the context of a simple model of a target population with two ability types we find conditions under which a work requirement reduces the costs of poor relief, and those when it does not. We concentrate on a case when work done in return for benefits has no social value, showing that even if this is true, work requirements may be a valuable policy tool.

An analysis of technology adoption decisions by poor farmers is provided. Some possible empirical models for studying technology adoption are reviewed. The issue of theoretical consistency is dealt with in terms of the costs of such consistency, measured in data needs and model complexity, and the benefits, measured in terms of understanding the micro-economic foundations of adoption.

A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes.This essay has three main aims.First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes.It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of political economy.Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and re-examines some of the claims made, in a setting unified both in terms of policy outcomes and the period under study.Third, the paper develops some new directions for research, presenting a small number of novel exploratory results.

A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes. It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of political economy. Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and re-examines some of the claims made, in a setting unified both in terms of policy outcomes and the period under study. Third, the paper develops some new directions for research, presenting a small number of novel exploratory results.

This paper argues that the possibility of bailouts to financial intermediaries distorts the supply price of capital and creates an argument for taxing financial bonuses separately from other sources of income. We develop a model of financial contracting where intermediaries compete for workers whose actions affect productivity and risk-taking in the financial sector. This derives the second-best optimum and market equilibrium. The optimal taxes that we propose increase both equity and efficiency compared to the pure market outcome.

This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using rightto- work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.