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Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates

Econometrica 2018 86(5), 1621-1649
In French parliamentary and local elections, candidates ranked first and second in the first round automatically qualify for the second round, while a third candidate qualifies only when selected by more than 12.5 percent of registered citizens. Using a fuzzy RDD around this threshold, we find that the third candidate's presence substantially increases the share of registered citizens who vote for any candidate and reduces the vote share of the top two candidates. It disproportionately harms the candidate ideologically closest to the third and causes her defeat in one fifth of the races. Additional evidence suggests that these results are driven by voters who value voting expressively over voting strategically for the top‐two candidate they dislike the least to ensure her victory; and by third candidates who, absent party‐level agreements leading to their dropping out, value the benefits associated with competing in the second round more than influencing its outcome.

Electoral Turnovers

Review of Economic Studies 2025 92(5), 3306-3339
In most national elections, voters face a key choice between continuity and change. Electoral turnovers occur when the incumbent candidate or party fails to win reelection. To understand how turnovers affect national outcomes, we study all presidential and parliamentary elections held globally between 1946 and 2018. We document the prevalence of turnovers over time and estimate their effects on economic performance, human development, and the quality of democracy. Using a close-elections regression discontinuity design across countries, we show that turnovers improve several measures of country performance. To explain these positive effects, we explore how electoral turnovers affect leader characteristics, shape policy decisions, reduce perceived corruption, and foster accountability.

Biometric Monitoring, Service Delivery, and Misreporting: Evidence from Healthcare in India

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025 107(6), 1553-1572
We examine the impact of biometric monitoring devices placed in tuberculosis treatment centers in Indian slums. The devices record health worker attendance and patient visits. Combining survey data, random center visits, and hospital registers, we find that patients at biometric-equipped centers are 25% less likely to interrupt treatment, reflecting increased efforts by health workers and greater daily adherence by patients. The technology also improves the quality of public data by reducing overreported patient numbers and underreported treatment interruptions. Overall, our results suggest that real-time monitoring of service delivery can strengthen the state’s capacity to serve poor and marginalized populations.

Keep Your Enemies Closer: Strategic Platform Adjustments during US and French Elections

American Economic Review 2025 115(8), 2488-2528
We study changes in political discourse during campaigns, using a novel dataset of candidate websites for US House elections, 2002–2016, and manifestos for French parliamentary and local elections, 1958–2022. We find that candidates move to the center in ideology and rhetorical complexity between the first round (or primary) and the second round (or general election). This convergence reflects candidates’ strategic adjustment to their opponents, as predicted by Downsian competition: Using an RDD we show that candidates converge to the platform of opponents who narrowly qualified for the last round as opposed to those who narrowly failed to qualify. (JEL D72, D83, D91)