We examine the formation and evolution of corporate risk culture, that is, the preferences toward risk and uncertainty shared by a firm’s leaders, as well as its effect on corporate policies. We document persistent commonality in risk attitudes inside firms, which arises through the selection of leaders with similar preferences and is rooted in the founders’ risk attitudes. Changes in corporate risk culture over time affect corporate investment policies, whereas cross-sectional differences in founders’ risk attitudes, that is, firms’ initial risk culture, contribute to differences across firms in persistent firm policies, such as research and development intensity.

We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs’ attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, uncertainty-averse CEOs prefer targets in familiar industries and targets that can be more easily integrated. The emphasis on cultural identity by CEOs’ parents and the ethnic composition of CEOs’ early life environment significantly influence the cultural transmission process. Cultural differences about uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time.

We evaluate whether management risk, which arises from investors’ uncertainty about management’s added value, affects firms’ default risks and debt pricing. We find that, regardless of the reason for the turnover, CDS, loan, and bond yield spreads increase at the time of management turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure. The effects increase with prior investor uncertainty about the new management. These results are consistent with the view that management risk affects firms’ default risk. An understanding of management risk yields a number of implications for corporate finance. Received May 15, 2016; editorial decision February 27, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

This paper documents the existence of a CEO investment cycle, in which disinvestment decreases over a CEO's tenure, while investment increases, leading to “cyclical” firm growth in assets and employment. The estimated variation in investment rate over the CEO investment cycle is of the same order of magnitude as the differences caused by business cycles or financial constraints. Results from a number of tests generally support the view that the investment cycle is caused by agency problems, leading to increasing investment quantity and decreasing investment quality over time as the CEO gains more control over his board.

Consistent with predictions from a stylized Bayesian learning model stock return volatility declines with CEO tenure in a convex manner, even for CEOs whose appointments occur for exogenous reasons. The decline is faster when there is higher uncertainty about the CEO's ability when there is more transparency about the firm's prospects, and when CEO ability is more important in value creation. We quantify the importance of uncertainty about CEO ability relative to the firm's fundamental cash flow uncertainty in contributing to stock return volatility, highlighting the importance of management in creating value.

We use complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to study the interplay between social norms and the effectiveness of consumer protection laws. We find that a higher level of trust in a given location is associated with a lower number of complaints filed against financial institutions in that location. Employing a difference‐in‐differences approach, we further find that, after the establishment of the CFPB, banks in low‐trust areas reduce fees charged to consumers more compared to banks in high‐trust areas. Our results suggest that the threat of consumer complaints to a government agency affects how banks treat their customers, and they shed light on the interaction between informal culture and formal institutions, as well as on stakeholders’ influence in corporate policies.

We examine equity markets’ reaction to the first‐time disclosure of the CEO‐worker pay ratio by U.S. public companies in 2018. We find that firms disclosing higher pay ratios experience significantly lower abnormal announcement returns. Firms whose shareholders are more inequality‐averse experience a more negative market response to high pay ratios. Furthermore, during 2018 more inequality‐averse investors rebalance their portfolios away from stocks with a high pay ratio relative to other investors. Our results suggest that equity markets are concerned about high within‐firm pay dispersion, and investors’ inequality aversion is a channel through which high pay ratios negatively affect firm value.