I investigate how the consolidation of securitization entities under SFAS 166 and 167 spills over to banks' supply of small business loans, which are rarely securitized in the United States. This spillover operates through two channels. (1) In the leverage channel, consolidating banks downsize their entire loan portfolios, both small business loans and other loans, in response to increased leverage after consolidation. (2) In the risk management channel, consolidating banks adjust the mix of loans to maintain optimal diversification. The adjustment can increase the supply of small business loans when their performance covaries positively with the performance of other loans. I find that, on average, banks that consolidate more securitized assets reduce small business lending; consequently, counties with a greater market share of consolidating banks experience slower growth in small businesses. I also identify a small group of banks with sufficiently large positive performance covariance that increase small business lending. Data Availability: All untabulated results are available upon request.

Understanding the role of bank lending in corporate innovation is important to policymakers, practitioners, and academics. We provide new evidence on such a role by exploiting the implementation of SFAS 166/167, which removed the off‐balance sheet status of certain securitized assets of banks. The regulation affects bank lending and thus represents a credit supply shock to borrowing firms. We find that affected banks raise spreads and cut loan amounts after the regulation. Firms that borrow from affected banks reduce R&D investment and the number and quality of the patents they generate. The reduction is concentrated among firms whose banks experience more downward pressure on capital ratios and greater market discipline, and firms that are more dependent on external financing. Additional analyses reveal that information asymmetry between incumbent banks and outsiders with respect to borrowing firms prevent them from switching. The overall findings suggest that bank lending promotes borrowing firms' innovation activities. Policies that restrict bank lending are likely to hurt innovation of borrowers.

The CARD Act restricts consumer credit card issuers’ ability to raise interest rates. We examine whether the Act influences the degree to which an issuer adjusts offered interest rates in response to changes in interest rates offered by other lenders in credit card solicitations—the price responsiveness. Using small business card offers as a control group, we find a significant decline in the price responsiveness after the Act. The decline is concentrated among other lenders’ rate reductions rather than rate increases and is more pronounced in areas with more subprime borrowers. The results underscore an unintended consequence of regulating the consumer credit market.

The originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, in which the originators of mortgages sell or securitize the mortgages to third parties, likely contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. Auditors were blamed for permitting clients to understate the risks of the model in their financial reports, fostering undisciplined lending. We investigate whether public audit oversight influences OTD lending by promoting more vigilant audits of the financial reports of originators. Using a difference-in-differences design prior to the financial crisis, we find reduced OTD lending by banks after the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) criticizes their auditors’ audits of financial reports regarding OTD transactions. The reduction is greater for banks with poorer risk controls and stronger incentives to manage earnings. We also find a reduction in gains on loan sales and securitizations. The results suggest that PCAOB inspections can help discipline OTD lending, a real effect of public audit oversight in the United States.

Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less associated with reduced corruption in countries where there is significant government ownership in the banking system and deposit insurance schemes. This evidence is consistent with timely loan loss recognition being less of a deterrent to lending corruption when banks are less disciplined by their capital providers.

We provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long-run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees’ perceptions of employment security. In particular, we exploit exogenous state-level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward earnings management when benefits increase. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals, increased recognition of special items and write downs, and greater likelihood of net income-reducing restatements, following an increase in state-level unemployment benefits. A number of cross-sectional results are also consistent with the hypothesis.

We investigate changes in the risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other nonconforming, and commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators during the recent financial crisis. Using the volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations as early as 2006. Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors recognized the increased credit risk of other nonconforming and commercial mortgage securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that risk-relevance varies cross-sectionally with structural characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and the presence of special servicers for commercial mortgage securitizations. Our results inform the current debates on the opacity of securitization structures and highlight the need to take into account cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-relevance across securitized asset classes and securitization characteristics (e.g., quality and type of collateral and transaction structure).

We use machine learning methods and high‐dimensional detailed financial data to predict the direction of one‐year‐ahead earnings changes. Our models show significant out‐of‐sample predictive power: the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve ranges from 67.52% to 68.66%, significantly higher than the 50% of a random guess. The annual size‐adjusted returns to hedge portfolios formed based on the prediction of our models range from 5.02% to 9.74%. Our models outperform two conventional models that use logistic regressions and small sets of accounting variables, and professional analysts’ forecasts. Analyses suggest that the outperformance relative to the conventional models stems from both nonlinear predictor interactions missed by regressions and the use of more detailed financial data by machine learning.

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks’ loan‐level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. These effects significantly exceed those of banks’ off–balance sheet securitized assets, consistent with our results being driven by the consolidation of securitization entities rather than by securitization per se. We conduct tests that help rule out the financial crisis as an alternative explanation for our results. Further analyses suggest that mechanisms underlying the results include consolidating banks’ reduced regulatory capital adequacy, increased market discipline, and consequent desire not to recognize high‐risk mortgages on balance sheet.

Exploiting differential interstate-branching deregulation across contiguous counties of adjacent states, we investigate the effect of entry threat on incumbent banks’ loan-loss provisions. Incumbents exposed to entry threat have offsetting incentives; lower provisions make their loan-underwriting quality appear better, deterring entry, but make local economic conditions appear better, encouraging entry. We find that the incentive to increase apparent loan-underwriting quality dominates on average. We further find that this incentive is stronger in counties with a higher proportion of heterogeneous loans, while the other incentive dominates in counties with both low heterogeneous loans and highly volatile economic conditions.