In this paper, we examine whether managers time their debt-equity choices to exploit market mispricing. Controlling for the level of external financing and corporate investment activities, we find evidence consistent with the market timing hypothesis. We find managers issue more equity relative to debt when analysts are relatively optimistic about firms’ long-term growth prospects. Moreover, equity issuers earn lower returns than debt issuers at subsequent earnings announcements. Controlling for research and development (R&D) investment, we find that, consistent with the market timing hypothesis and inconsistent with the extant empirical literature, the debt-equity composition of external financing predicts year-ahead stock return.

We find the limited supply of female directors, rather than gender differences or boardroom biases, can create an informational disadvantage for some female independent directors, as measured by their open market trading profits. The information disparity is largely isolated to firms with abnormally low representation by female directors. Female independent directors who are located further away from the company's headquarters, have less industry experience or have shorter tenure exhibit the most limited information access. Accounting for these obstacles reduces the gender disparity in information. We further find that this information disparity among female independent directors contributes to the variation in their influence on board monitoring. More informed female independent directors are associated with fewer restatements, lower abnormal CEO compensation and higher Tobin's Q. Our results have several policy implications.

We examine the real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in the expectation of further partial privatization generated by China's split share structure reform, which mandatorily converts non-tradable shares into freely tradable shares and opens up the gate to the further privatization of state-owned enterprises. We find that partial privatization prospects have a positive effect on corporate innovation. A better alignment of the interests of government agents with those of private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness appear to be two plausible underlying mechanisms. Our paper sheds new light on the real effects of partial privatization.

The cash conversion cycle (CCC) is important for fundamental analysis as an indicator of management effectiveness in cash and financing. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence for its implications on asset pricing except for the very recent findings that high CCCs negatively predict stock returns in the U.S. By investigating 47 developed and emerging markets from 1993 to 2018, we find a mild CCC effect across the globe. The Low-minus-High equal-weighted hedge portfolios sorted by components of CCC yield significant Fama-French five-factor alphas ranging from 0.277 to 0.730% per month. Our results are consistent with a mispricing explanation by analyzing earnings prediction, announcement returns around future earnings, and limits of arbitrage although there is also some evidence for a risk-based explanation. Moreover, the CCC effect is stronger in emerging markets than developed markets and for markets with more political risk and less integrated with the global market.