We examine whether audit partner individualism reduces earnings comparability in the United States. We argue that individualistic audit partners are more likely to deviate from internal working rules and allow clients more flexibility in making accounting choices, consequently decreasing their clients' earnings comparability. Using a novel partner‐level measure of individualism, we find that within individual Big 4 audit firms, earnings are less comparable between a company audited by an individualistic partner and a company audited by a non‐individualistic partner, relative to a pair of companies that are each audited by a non‐individualistic partner. Our inferences are robust to a changes analysis, a falsification test, and a propensity score matching procedure. We also find that the effect of partner individualism is less salient when the audit firm is under more stringent regulatory monitoring and when clients are more important, but more salient when individualistic partners are more confident about being different. Further analyses suggest that our main inferences are robust to controlling for differences in partners' cultural backgrounds and using client‐pairs audited by the same audit partner. Collectively, our study provides novel evidence on the role of auditor individualism in earnings comparability.

This study investigates whether PCAOB inspections of foreign auditors affect global financial reporting comparability. Foreign auditors may adjust audit methodologies to address PCAOB inspection findings, which could affect financial reporting of local clients. Exploiting both within‐ and cross‐country variation in PCAOB inspections, we predict and find that non‐US‐listed foreign companies' financial reporting becomes more comparable to their US and non‐US industry peers after their auditors undergo an initial inspection. However, there is a decrease in comparability compared to local peers whose auditors have not been inspected. Subsample tests suggest that the improvement in comparability is driven by (i) auditors that satisfactorily address deficiencies and (ii) auditors that do not publicly push back against deficiencies. The effects are dampened after local audit regulators begin inspection programs. Overall, our evidence suggests that the PCAOB international inspection program affects audit methodologies of inspected auditors in a consistent way, improving comparability across jurisdictions. The improved comparability implies that the PCAOB international inspection program may unintentionally help meet accounting regulators' goals of cross‐country financial reporting convergence, which potentially promotes efficient cross‐country capital allocation.

Using a comprehensive database of U.S. internal auditor job postings, we find that firms are about 10 percent more likely to post an internal auditor job after the revelation of accounting and operational failures. Also, the demand for internal auditors is stronger when a failure is more severe. Among firms posting internal auditor jobs, firms demand higher-quality internal auditors in response to a failure compared with when there has not been a recent failure. We find evidence of internal audit demand spillovers through connected directors, which helps mitigate concerns that the primary results are due to replacing internal auditors that recently left or due to endogenous links between hiring internal auditors and failure revelations. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms demand internal auditors to help ensure high-quality financial reporting and effective operations.

Brand name audit firms are global networks of local audit firms. These networks claim to enforce consistent audit methodologies across their member firms, which, if true, should systematically affect client financial reporting. We find that clients from different countries have more (less) comparable accruals when they are audited by local audit firms from the same global network (different global networks). Furthermore, inferences are similar when we examine client accrual comparability around audit firm switches induced by the failure of Andersen, which serves as a shock that helps improve identification. In falsification tests, having auditors from the same global network is not associated with differences in operating cash flows. Results also suggest that the role of global network methodologies in global financial reporting comparability is more pronounced across stronger investor protection jurisdictions and across jurisdictions that have adopted International Standards on Auditing.