Relying on theories in which bank create private money by making loans that create deposits—a process we call “funding liquidity creation”—we measure how much funding liquidity the U.S. banking system creates. Private money creation by banks enables lending to not be constrained by the supply of cash deposits. During the 2001–2020 period, 92 percent of bank deposits were due to funding liquidity creation, and during 2011–2020 funding liquidity creation averaged $10.7 trillion per year, or 57 percent of GDP. Using natural disasters data, we provide causal evidence that better-capitalized banks create more funding liquidity and lend more even during times when cash deposit balances are falling or unchanged. Large banks as well as the top banks in Federal Reserve districts create more liquidity.

This paper analyses a model of strategic exploration in which competing players independently explore a set of alternatives. The model features a multiple-player multiple-armed bandit problem and captures a strategic trade-off between pre-emption—covert exploration of alternatives that the opponent will explore in the future—and prioritization—exploration of the most promising alternatives. Our results explain how the strategic trade-off shapes equilibrium behaviours and outcomes, for example, in technology races between superpowers and R&D competitions between firms. We show that players compete on the same set of alternatives, leading to duplicated exploration from start to finish, and they explore alternatives that are a priori less promising before more promising ones are exhausted. The model also predicts that competition induces players to implement unreliable technologies too early, even though they should wait for the technologies to mature. Coordinated exploration is impossible even if the alternatives are equally promising, but it can emerge in equilibrium following a phase of pre-emptive competition if there is a short deadline. With asymmetric capacities of exploration, the weak player conducts extensive instead of intensive exploration—exploring as many alternatives as the strong player does but never fully exploring any.

We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.

We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

We study how a significant relaxation of internal migration restrictions affects labor market outcomes of incumbent migrants and natives, exploiting the 2014 hukou reform in China, which substantially removed the migration barriers of cities with an urban population below 5 million (nonmegacities). Using a difference-in-differences method, we find that migrants’ wages in nonmegacities experienced approximately a 2.6%–7.9% decline relative to that in megacities after the policy. The policy had nonnegative impacts on the wages of natives in nonmegacities. These results suggest that the downward wage pressure imposed by new migrants falls primarily on incumbent migrants rather than on natives.

We investigate how the presence of a college affects local educational attainment. As counterfactuals for current college locations, we use historical “runner-up” locations that were strongly considered to become college sites but were ultimately not chosen. We find that winning counties today have college degree attainment rates 56% higher than runner-up counties and more private-sector employment in human-capital-intensive industries. These effects are not driven primarily by recent in-migration of educated adults, and alternative public investments did not have similar effects on local educational attainment. The results indicate that colleges played an important role in shaping long-run local outcomes.

This study examines the real effects of third-party certification on green bond issuance by Chinese listed firms over the period 2016–2022. Our findings reveal that the issuance of certified (non-certified) green bonds results in favourable (non-significant or even negative) stock market reactions in both the short and long term, indicating that third-party certification adds value for stock investors. In addition, we analyse the underlying mechanisms that drive the value creation of third-party certification in green bond issuance. We find that third-party certification effectively reduces information asymmetries between firms and investors, induces firms to genuinely prioritise sustainable practices and improves firms' environmental performance, leading to increases in investor demand and firm value. Our further analysis reveals that third-party certification helps green bond issuers attract long-term investors, increases analyst coverage and induces positive opinions from the regulator on firm disclosure. Overall, this study documents that third-party certification of green bond issuers can generate real economic and environmental benefits for issuers.

We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents’ decision-making and the empirical literature; however, they cause difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive-compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature (the rural hospitals theorem, welfare lattice, etc.) survive.