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When does competition mitigate agency problems?

Journal of Corporate Finance 2018 51, 258-274
This paper examines how the performance correlation of firms in an industry affects the degree to which product market competition mitigates agency problems. Consistent with theory, I find that in industries with high firm performance correlation, product market competition reduces the adverse effect of business combination (BC) laws on firm operating performance, while in industries with low performance correlation competition does not have such an effect. My results are robust to (i) the use of different measures of performance correlation, competition, and operating performance; (ii) excluding firms that are not exogenously affected by BC laws, (iii) dropping the years that are affected by the first-generation state antitakeover laws. I find similar results for stock prices when examining the stock market reactions to the first newspaper reports of BC laws. Overall, the disciplining effect of competition depends positively on an industry's performance correlation.

Thematic Concentration and Mutual Fund Performance

Review of Financial Studies 2026
This study examines whether mutual fund managers generate alpha through thematic investment strategies that select stocks poised to benefit from specific themes. Using textual analysis of 10-K filings, we identify stocks’ thematic exposures and construct each fund’s thematic concentration index (TCI) from its holdings. High-TCI funds significantly outperform, with a top-minus-bottom decile spread of 4.26% in annualized four-factor alpha. Managers’ thematic expertise is related to their undergraduate field of study. Outperformance arises from superior stock selection rather than theme-related timing, with an informational advantage on firm earnings, particularly in stocks exposed to themes related to managers’ undergraduate training.

Can information be locked up? Informed trading ahead of macro-news announcements

Journal of Financial Economics 2016 121(3), 496-520
Government agencies routinely allow pre-release access to information to accredited news agencies under embargo agreements. Using high-frequency data, we find evidence consistent with informed trading during embargoes of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) scheduled announcements. The E-mini Standard & Poor’s 500 futures’ abnormal order imbalances are in the direction of subsequent policy surprises and contain information that predicts the market reaction to the policy announcements. The estimated informed trades’ profits are arguably large. Notably, we find no evidence of informed trading prior to the start of FOMC news embargoes or during lockups ahead of nonfarm payroll, US Producer Price Index, and gross domestic product data releases.

Surviving the fintech disruption

Journal of Financial Economics 2025 171, 104071
We examine the impact of fintech on firm labor demand, job turnover, and firm performance. Occupations with higher exposure to fintech experience a net decline in job postings and employment, though both complementary and substitutive effects emerge across different sectors. Fintech blurs traditional industry boundaries, creating demand for workers with a combination of finance and technology skills. In response, firms upskill through hiring, reallocate talent internally, and pivot innovation to new areas. As a result, firms are better equipped to absorb the shock than individual workers, with innovative firms even experiencing growth in employment, sales, and productivity upon fintech disruption.

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

Journal of Finance 2019 74(2), 587-638
We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.

Prime (information) brokerage

Journal of Financial Economics 2020 137(2), 371-391
We show that hedge funds gain an information advantage from their prime broker banks regarding the banks’ corporate borrowers. The connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stocks of borrowing firms prior to loan announcements, and these trades outperform other trades. The outperformance is particularly strong for trades of hedge funds that have high revenue potential for prime broker banks. These informed trades appear to be based on information not just about the loan itself but also about firms’ fundamentals such as future earnings. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that equity analysts inside the banks are one potential conduit of information transfer.

Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide

Journal of Finance 2013 68(2), 739-783
This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.

Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance

Journal of Finance 2015 70(6), 2733-2776
We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.