This paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from Thailand, show that the family firm’s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.

We find inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well on average. Non-consanguineous heir-run firms outperform blood heirs' firms, and roughly match founder-run listed firms, while blood heirs surpass professional managers at running family firms. Further, succession events suggest that adopted heirs “cause” elevated performance. We suggest that heir-run firms do well because non-consanguineous heirs displace the least talented blood heirs, the non-consanguineous heir “job” motivates professional managers, and the threat of displacement encourages blood heirs' effort and human capital accumulation, mitigating the “Carnegie conjecture” that inherited wealth deadens talent.

From January 2011 through March 2018, the Bank of Japan purchased equity index exchange-traded funds (ETFs) worth about 3.5% of GDP. Identification of the effect of central bank ETF purchases on stock valuations and corporate responses is via differently-weighted and changing stock indices. BOJ purchases lift valuations, increase share issuances, and increase total assets. On average, the latter increase is due to cash and short-term securities rather than capital investment. However, firms with worse corporate governance do increase capital investment. These findings suggest central bank equity purchases are a problematic tool for stimulating economic growth through high broad-based private-sector corporate investment.

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.