We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) in which firms follow one of four price‐setting regimes: sticky prices, sticky information, rule of thumb, or full‐information flexible prices. The parameters of the model, including the fraction of each type of firm, are estimated by matching the moments of the observed variables of the model to those found in the data. We find that sticky price firms and sticky information firms jointly account for over 80% of firms in the model. We compare the performance of our hybrid model to pure sticky price and sticky information models along various dimensions, including monetary policy implications.

This paper argues for a careful (re)consideration of the expectations formation process and a more systematic inclusion of real-time expectations through survey data in macroeconomic analyses. While the rational expectations revolution has allowed for great leaps in macroeconomic modeling, the surveyed empirical microevidence appears increasingly at odds with the full-information rational expectation assumption. We explore models of expectation formation that can potentially explain why and how survey data deviate from full-information rational expectations. Using the New Keynesian Phillips curve as an extensive case study, we demonstrate how incorporating survey data on inflation expectations can address a number of otherwise puzzling shortcomings that arise under the assumption of full-information rational expectations. (JEL D04, E24, E27, E31, E37)

We propose a new approach to test the full-information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from information rigidities. This approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null and the underlying degree of information rigidity. Applying this approach to US and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with the presence of information rigidities. These results therefore provide a set of stylized facts which can be used to calibrate imperfect information models. Finally, we document evidence of state-dependence in the expectations formation process. (JEL C53, D83, D84, E13, E31, E37)

With positive trend inflation, the Taylor principle does not guarantee a determinate equilibrium. We provide new theoretical results on determinacy in New Keynesian models with positive trend inflation and new empirical findings on the Federal Reserve's reaction function before and after the Volcker disinflation to find that, (i) while the Fed likely satisfied the Taylor principle before Volcker, the US economy was still subject to self-fulfilling fluctuations in the 1970s, (ii) the US economy switched to determinacy during the Volcker disinflation, and (iii) the switch reflected changes in the Fed's response to macroeconomic variables and the decline in trend inflation. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E32, E52)

A lot. We derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers, firms, central bankers, and professional forecasters. We document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks, leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information. The dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities. The conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities.

For a large number of OECD countries we estimate the cross-country spillover effects of government purchases on output. Following the methodology in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, b), we allow these multipliers to vary smoothly according to the state of the economy and use real-time forecast data to purge policy innovations of their predictable components. Our findings suggest that cross-country spillovers have an important impact. The findings also confirm those of our earlier papers--namely that fiscal shocks have a larger impact when the affected country is in recession.

We survey New Zealand firms and document novel facts about their macroeconomic beliefs. There is widespread dispersion in beliefs about past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation. This dispersion in beliefs is consistent with firms’ incentives to collect and process information. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy and that changes in their beliefs affect their decisions. Inflation is not generally perceived as being important to business decisions so firms devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation. (JEL D22, D83, D84, E31, E52)

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

We argue that a more individualist culture leads to more innovation and to higher growth because of the social status rewards associated with innovation in that culture. We use data on the frequency of particular genes associated with collectivist cultures, as well as a measure of distance in terms of frequencies of blood types, and historic prevalence of pathogens to instrument individualism scores. The relationship between individualism and innovation/growth remains strong even after controlling for institutions and other potentially confounding factors. We also provide evidence consistent with two-way causality between culture and institutions.

Why did Finland experience, in 1991–1993, the deepest recession observed in an industrialized country since the 1930s? Using a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor frictions, we argue that the collapse of the Soviet-Finnish trade was a major contributor to the contraction. Finland's experience mirrors that of the transition economies of Eastern Europe, which suffered similar deep recessions coupled with institutional changes. By focusing on the Finnish case, we isolate the effects of the Finnish-Soviet trade collapse and shed new light on the sources of recessions in transition economies.