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Bank Interventions and Trade Credit: Evidence from Debt Covenant Violations

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2019 54(5), 2179-2207
This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.

Employee Inside Debt and Firm Risk-Taking: Evidence from Employee Deposit Programs in Japan

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2019 8(2), 302-347
Unlike broad-based equity ownership by employees, ownership of company debt by rank-and-file employees has not received much attention. We argue that company debt held by employees in the form of in-company deposits can monitor risk-taking and facilitate risk discovery. Employee deposits have been historically widely used in Japan. For a sample of 2,104 Japanese firms, using an identification strategy that utilizes a new law in 2003 that changed the priority of employee deposits in bankruptcy and led to large-scale withdrawals of employee deposits, we find that employee deposits mitigate firms’ risk-taking behavior and reduce the agency cost of debt. Received November 2, 2018; editorial decision May 1, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Wrong Kind of Transparency? Mutual Funds’ Higher Reporting Frequency, Window Dressing, and Performance

Journal of Accounting Research 2024 62(2), 737-781
This study examines whether mandatory increase in reporting frequency exacerbates agency problems. Utilizing the setting of the 2004 SEC mandate on increased reporting frequency of mutual fund holdings, we show that increased reporting frequency elevates window dressing (buying winners or selling losers shortly before the end of the reporting period). This effect is driven by low‐skill fund managers’ incentives to generate mixed signals. Funds managed by low‐skill managers experience lower returns, more outflows, and a higher collapse rate when their window dressing is elevated after the 2004 rule change. These results suggest that, although higher reporting frequency on agents’ actions can exacerbate signal manipulations, the related manipulation costs improve sorting among agents in the longer term.

Peer default and EDGAR searches

Journal of Corporate Finance 2025 95, 102891
We find that a borrower default causes an increase in investors' EDGAR searches for non-defaulting borrowers that share the same relationship bank. This effect is more pronounced when the lending relationship between the defaulting borrower and the defaulted-upon bank is stronger and when the reliance of non-defaulting borrowers on the defaulted-upon bank is greater. The co-movement of information acquisition for non-defaulting borrowers increases after the peer default, which leads to a co-movement in the issuance of management forecasts and a co-movement in stock returns. In sum, our research supports a network effect of peer defaults on information acquisition.

Labor Mobility and Loan Origination

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2024 59(5), 2099-2132
We find that mortgage loans originated after the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD; a mechanism discouraging loan officers’ labor mobility) have a lower default probability, a higher loan modification rate, and a lower foreclosure rate. These effects are unaccompanied by any reduction in loan supply and contribute to more stable housing prices. Using the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as an alternative identification generates consistent results. Overall, our findings suggest that restricting loan officers’ labor mobility leads to better ex ante screening and ex post monitoring, improving the origination efficiency for U.S. residential mortgage loans.