This paper studies the impact of financial structures and regulations on export dynamics using data from a large panel of countries over the 1997–2014 period. The results suggest that bank-oriented financial systems can boost the number of exporters more than market-oriented systems. However, especially in lower income countries with lax bank regulation, banks tend to reduce the dynamism of the export sector, slowing down exporters’ entry and exit. This reduced dynamism appears to reflect domestic banks’ protection of incumbent exporters more than banks’ screening of entrants or buffering of incumbents in difficult times. Foreign banks mitigate these effects, enhancing the dynamism of the export sector

Using a sample from 38 economies, we examine the relation between bank regulators’ supervisory power and loan spreads. We find that loans issued by banks in economies with more powerful supervisors have higher spreads. The positive association is more pronounced when firms have lower credit quality, when the relationships between firms and banks are less established, when syndicate loans involve fewer lenders, and when lead banks have a riskier profile. Further analyses reveal that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have smaller size and shorter maturity, and the loans are more likely to have collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. Overall, these results suggest that stronger supervisory power of bank regulators affects loan contracting by mitigating lenders’ excessive risk taking

We discuss “Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators” by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BDES's analyses and inferences and suggest additional analyses to improve and deepen them. Most notably, we caution that effective bank regulation entails reducing risk for riskier banks; risk reduction for safer banks suggests regulatory overreach. Our evidence is more indicative of regulatory overreach. Thus, although BDES is an important step forward in understanding the role auditors can and do play in improving information available to key decision-makers other than through auditor reports on financial statements and internal controls, a comprehensive assessment of whether the benefits of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators exceed its costs is left for future research. Such an assessment is necessary before concluding whether mandatory auditor reporting leads to more effective bank regulation or regulatory overreach

This paper analyzes the effects of bank capital regulation on the link between bank size and volatility. Using bank-level data for 27 advanced economies over the 2000–2014 period, we estimate a power law that relates the volume of a bank’s loan portfolio to the volatility of loan growth. Our analysis reveals, first, that more stringent capital regulation weakens the size-volatility nexus. Hence, in countries with more stringent capital regulation, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Second, the effect of tighter capital requirements on the size-volatility nexus becomes stronger for the upper tail of the bank size distribution. This is in line with capitalization decreasing with bank size, such that larger banks tend to be more affected by increasing capital requirements. Third, in countries with higher sectoral capital buffers, the size-volatility nexus is weaker

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable

This paper examines the impact of risk-sensitive Basel regulations on debt financing of firms around the world. It investigates how firms cope with the impact through adjustments to their financing sources and capital investments. We find that the implementation of Basel II regulations is associated with reduced credit availability for lower-rated firms. Such firms mitigate the shortage in bank credit through increased reliance on accounts payable, lower payouts to shareholders, and reduced capital investments. The impact of the capital regulation is lower in countries that rely on the internal ratings-based approach. The key results are robust to controls for banking crises, bank-specific controls, and the inclusion of loan-level information. The findings of this paper substantially contribute to the understanding of the real effects of risk-sensitive bank capital regulations

We examine how cross-country differences in capital regulations shape the structure of global lending syndicates. Using globally syndicated loans extended by banks from forty-four countries, we find that strictly regulated banks participate more in syndicates originated by lead lenders facing less stringent capital regulations. The resulting lending syndicates extend loans to riskier borrowers, charge higher spreads, forego covenants more frequently, and incur higher default rates. Such syndication activity also facilitates the access to credit by riskier corporations and exposes both participants and lead arrangers to greater systemic risk. Overall, our finding is consistent with the explanation that strictly regulated banks rely on the expertise of loosely regulated banks to procure risky deals outside the border

We evolve competitive measures of market discipline, and explore their associated ramifications for banking, by way of the effects of Basel II adoption. Using principal component analysis on the data of 706 banks from 34 countries, we generate measures that are better reflective of market discipline universally than any single variable that is popularly in use – e.g., subordinated debt activity. Interestingly, some of our measures are more suited to assessing market discipline in emerging economies than in developed economies and vice-versa, and some are suited to use across both groups of economies. Importantly, using impact assessment, we find that our constructs are indeed credible proxies for the Basel II envisaged market discipline; they are variously negatively related to Basel II adoption. Furthermore, bank performance, measured by profitability and stability, also exhibit significant responsiveness to the adoption of market discipline, with, for instance, less impact on developed economy banks’ profitability than on emerging economy banks’ profitability, and decline in loan risk in emerging economy banks versus the increase in loan risk in developed economy banks (which is interestingly mitigated by stable equity cushion and higher liquidity). These and other results of our paper provide useful policy guides for several stakeholders of the banking industry

We examine the impact of bank liquidity creation on systemic risk and its heterogeneous impact over the network connectedness. We find that excessive liquidity creation increases the systemic risk with a “U shape” relationship, while internal and external liquidity creation drives systemic risk in a different way. Network connectedness of banks strengthens the relationship between liquidity creation and systemic risk. Our results provide supporting evidence on regulating bank liquidity creation to enhance the financial stability