Knowledge that Transforms

This article uses 1990 census data to study the effects of immigrant inflows on occupation-specific labor market outcomes. I find that intercity mobility rates of natives and earlier immigrants are insensitive to immigrant inflows. However, occupation-specific wages and employment rates are systematically lower in cities with higher relative supplies of workers in a given occupation. The results imply that immigrant inflows over the 1980s reduced wages and employment rates of low-skilled natives in traditional gateway cities like Miami and Los Angeles by 1-3 percentage points.

This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. The switch to regulation can then be seen as an efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age. The model makes sense of the progressive reform agenda, and of the successes and failures of alternative law enforcement strategies in different countries.

Financial and real investment flexibility, tax competition, and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation. While these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies, such as deferral, double taxation, apportionment, and trade rules, very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models. In this paper, I show how the integration of investment flexibility, tax competition, and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies.

This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization “works” in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.

This paper surveys the microfoundations, empirical evidence, and estimation issues underlying the aggregate matching function. There is no consensus yet on microfoundations but one is emerging on estimation. An aggregate, constant returns, Cobb-Douglas matching function with hires as a function of vacancies and unemployment has been successfully estimated for several countries. Recent work has utilized disaggregated data to go beyond aggregate estimates, with many refinements and suggestions for future research. The paper discusses spatial aggregation issues, and implications of on-the-job search and of the timing of stocks and flows for estimated matching functions.

According to the permanent income hypothesis with quadratic preferences, households save for a rainy day the transitory component of income innovations and consume entirely the permanent one. The model also rules out precautionary saving. Typically, income shock components are not separately observable, and information on the conditional variance of income is hard to come by. We show how to combine income realizations with subjective expectations to identify separately the transitory and the permanent shock to income and to obtain a measure of idiosyncratic uncertainty, thus providing a powerful test of the theory in short panels. The empirical analysis is performed on a sample of Italian households drawn from the 1989–1991 Survey of Household Income and Wealth.

Because data are collected for only fatal crashes, it is difficult to accurately measure seat belt and air bag effectiveness. The use of safety devices influences survival rates which in turn determine whether a crash is included in the sample, leading to sample selection bias. We propose a simple solution to the selection problem: limiting the sample to crashes in which someone in a different vehicle dies. Empirically, we find seat belts more effective and air bags to be less effective than previously found. The cost per life saved through seat belts is approximately $30,000, compared to $1.8 million for air bags.

Critics argue that the estate tax prevents the owners of family businesses from passing their enterprises to heirs because it is difficult to pay estate taxes without liquidating the business. Why don't owners purchase enough life insurance to meet their estate tax liabilities? We examine whether and how people use life insurance to deal with the estate tax. We find that, ceteris paribus, business owners purchase more life insurance than do other individuals. However, on the margin, their insurance purchases are less responsive to estate tax considerations, and they are less likely to have the wherewithal to meet estate tax liabilities out of liquid assets plus insurance.