Knowledge that Transforms

This paper characterizes how firms' strategic interaction in product markets affects the industry dynamics of investment and expected returns. In imperfectly competitive industries, a firm's exposure to systematic risk is affected by both its own investment strategy and the investment strategies of its peers, so that the dynamics of its expected returns depend on the intraindustry value spread. In the model and the data, firms' betas and returns correlate more positively in industries with low value spread, low dispersion in operating markups, and low concentration.

We provide evidence that higher-quality disclosure standards are associated with stock returns that are less sensitive to noise driven by investors' moods. We identify return-mood sensitivity (RMS) based on the association between index returns and urban cloudiness, a source of short-term variation in mood. Based on a stylized model, we predict and find evidence consistent with higher-quality disclosure standards reducing RMS by tilting susceptible investors' trades toward information and by facilitating sophisticated investors' arbitrage. Our findings suggest that disclosure standards play an important role in enhancing price efficiency by reducing noise in returns, particularly noise related to investors' short-term moods.

We estimate the risk and expected return of private equity using market prices of publicly traded funds of funds holding unlisted private equity funds and of publicly traded private equity funds participating directly in private equity transactions. We find that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns between −0.5% and 2% per year. In addition, private equity has a market beta close to one and a positive beta on the SMB factor. These listed funds exhibit greater systematic risk than an index based on the self-reported net asset value of unlisted private equity funds.

We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments. Switches to valuation equilibria, valuation runs, look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially, only if subsidized.

This paper shows that during industry downturns, firms experience significantly greater valuation losses when their industry peers' long-term debt is maturing at the time of the shocks. Across a range of tests, the analysis addresses the endogenous determination of peer debt-maturity structure. Overall, the evidence suggests that the negative externalities financially constrained firms impose on their industry peers can significantly amplify the effects of industry downturns. The evidence also provides support for the view that these amplification effects are driven by the adverse effect that financially constrained firms have on the balance sheets of their industry peers.

Opening the capital account allows financially constrained firms to raise capital from abroad. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, this increases the relative demand for skilled labor versus unskilled labor, leading to higher wage inequality. Using aggregate data and exploiting variation in the timing of capital account openings across 20 mainly European countries, I find that opening the capital account increases aggregate wage inequality. In order to identify the mechanism, I use sectoral data and exploit variation in external financial dependence and capital-skill complementarity across industries. I find that capital account opening increases sectoral wage inequality, particularly in industries with both high financial needs and strong complementarity.

We propose an equilibrium model for defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with “fragile beliefs” are uncertain about the underlying economic state and its probability. Estimation on sovereign European credit default swaps (CDS) data shows that agents require a time-varying risk premium for bearing state uncertainty. The model outperforms affine specifications with the same number of state variables, suggesting that there are important nonlinearities in credit spreads that are captured by our model. Contagion drives most of the variation in CDS spreads, especially before the crisis. However, economic fundamentals account for a significant fraction during the crisis.

We provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps (CDSs), building on the observation that CDSs have lower trading costs than bonds. CDS introduction involves a trade-off: it crowds out existing demand for the bond, but improves the bond allocation by allowing long-term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply. We characterize conditions under which CDS introduction raises bond prices. The model predicts a negative CDS-bond basis, as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence. We also show that a ban on naked CDSs can raise borrowing costs.

Published in Review of Financial Studies https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu078

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.