Knowledge that Transforms

In response to the extended audit report regulations implemented in the United States and internationally, both audit firms and regulators have increased scrutiny over critical audit matters/key audit matters (collectively referred to as CAMs) through internal and external inspections. At the same time, auditors and audit committees (ACs) have altered the content and timing of CAM‐related discussions by communicating specific planned audit procedures earlier in the audit process. This study explores the effect of early communication of CAM‐related audit procedures to the AC and increased scrutiny from inspections on auditors' propensity to adjust planned audit procedures in the presence of newly identified audit risks. Based on self‐justification theory, we predict and find that early communication of planned audit procedures to the AC causes auditors to be less likely to adjust planned audit procedures even when additional risks arise that necessitate change, especially when inspection is likely. This has the potential for diminished audit quality. Interviews with audit partners provide context for how these findings relate to the current auditing environment.

In this field study, we examine tax advisors' decision‐making process when developing tax planning arrangements. Through interviews with 40 tax advisors, our analysis indicates that tax savings may come at a price in practice by unveiling adverse post‐implementation experiences shared by tax partners. Partners find themselves in a tricky position at the time they form their recommendation as they cannot be certain that their client will be able to “live with their tax structure”—that is, maintain it and cope with the inherent risks once implemented. Their main concern is that their client may “get caught out” by a structure too aggressive or complicated for them, having no control over the client's behavior once the plan is implemented. This has significant implications in the tax planning decision‐making process as these concerns shape how partners adapt their work to their client's perceived competency and possibly restrain corporate firms' tax aggressiveness. Following Feller and Schanz (2017, Contemporary Accounting Research , 34 (1), 494–524), we conceive of this as the fourth hurdle of tax planning— whether a tax structure is maintainable, as perceived by tax advisors—and unpack how it operates. Interestingly, restraining the client's tax planning aggressiveness (and the corresponding potential tax savings) is not necessarily perceived by partners as detrimental to the client relationship. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of tax planning in action, highlighting how tax partners seek to influence their client's tax planning aggressiveness.

This study examines whether using cash‐flow‐based performance metrics (CFM) in CEO compensation contracts affects the design of loan contracts. Cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation explicitly motivates the CEO to improve the firm's cash flows, which may enhance debt repayment ability and reduce credit risk. We thus hypothesize that lenders, anticipating this incentive effect, offer lower loan spreads and reduce cash‐flow‐based performance covenants when firms use CFM in CEO compensation contracts. Consistent with our expectation, the use of CFM is associated with lower loan spreads and less use of cash‐flow‐based performance covenants. These findings remain robust after we account for endogeneity. Furthermore, these results are more pronounced in firms with higher credit risk or risk of cash flow shortfalls, suggesting that lenders consider internally generated cash flows more valuable when borrowers face higher external financing costs or have greater liquidity concerns. Additionally, we find that using CFM is associated with improved cash flow performance and enhanced creditworthiness, which supports the notion that CFM is an effective incentive mechanism. Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders consider the incentive effect of cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation in the debt contracting process.

We examine the economic determinants and informational effects of credit rating affirmations (i.e., the reiteration of past credit ratings) for a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2020. We find that credit rating affirmations typically follow major corporate events and changes in firm fundamentals that increase information uncertainty about a firm's creditworthiness, suggesting that affirmations reduce uncertainty. We further document that rating affirmations provide value‐relevant information to equity and debt investors. Using a short‐window event study method, we show that equity investors react positively to rating affirmations and that information uncertainty around affirmations diminishes. These findings are more pronounced for firms with non‐investment‐grade ratings. We further show that our results strengthen for firms with greater pre‐affirmation information uncertainty. Finally, consistent with our information uncertainty reduction results from the stock market, we report that bond yield spreads decrease for affirmed firms. Again, the effect is more pronounced for firms with non‐investment‐grade ratings. In summary, we highlight the significant capital markets' effects of credit rating affirmations, an area that the literature has largely ignored.

This paper presents new evidence on the economic benefits arising from common institutional ownership. We find a negative and significant effect of common institutional ownership on stock price crash risk. This effect is robust to a battery of robustness checks and is causal according to some identification tests, including difference‐in‐differences analyses on financial institution mergers. We find evidence that the negative effect is attributable to the monitoring role of common institutional owners—a role that is enabled by common owners' lower information processing cost and greater monitoring incentives owing to governance externalities. We also find that common owners negatively influence crash risk through constraining bad news hoarding and that common owners are more likely to force CEO turnover when a firm has higher crash risk. Overall, our results suggest that common institutional shareholders play a unique and effective monitoring role that fends off stock price crashes.

In empirically estimating the relation between CEO compensation and accounting‐based firm and peer performance, researchers often define the performance variables net of CEO compensation expense. We analytically show that a researcher's use of CEO compensation as a regression's dependent variable and as an expense in defining a regression's independent variables representing accounting‐based firm and peer performance will bias the researcher's pay‐for‐performance and relative performance evaluation (RPE) regression coefficients. In a panel estimation of CEO compensation, we document an attenuation bias in the coefficients on net firm and net peer performance. This evidence may partially explain inferences of weak CEO incentives and limited usage of RPE in prior work. Our results imply that in CEO compensation regressions, a researcher can remove biases in inferring CEO incentives and RPE usage by using gross rather than net accounting performance variables—that is, by adding back CEO compensation expense to net accounting measures.

We investigate whether a larger CEO employment network provides access to information that improves firms' earnings forecasts and find a significantly positive relation between CEO employment network size and management earnings forecast accuracy. Our results suggest that firms use information obtained from CEO contacts to increase the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our conclusion is further supported by evidence of positive associations between CEO employment network size and the likelihood, frequency, and precision of management earnings forecasts. We also find that CEO employment network size is positively related to analysts' reactions to the forecast news and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts relative to analyst forecasts. Overall, our results are consistent with a larger CEO employment network generating external information that increases the accuracy of firms' earnings forecasts.

Using a sample of 30,270 forecasts by 2,280 analysts under a stacked difference‐in‐differences framework involving 22 major climatic disasters in the United States, we examine the effect of climatic disasters on information production by security analysts, who play a crucial role in the financial market as information intermediaries. We find that earnings forecasts by analysts who experienced a major climatic disaster become less accurate than those by unaffected analysts within 3 months after the disaster, due to distracted attention. Disaster‐zone analysts are more likely to allocate their attention to firms of greater importance or salience, and they tend to reiterate their previous forecasts to maintain the quantity and timeliness of their forecasts. Overall, we document the real impact of cognitive bias on financial professionals' performance.

This study investigates the effects of audit committee financial expertise on the timeliness of banks' loan loss provisions. I employ two regulatory shocks that mandated audit committee expertise—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in 1991 (FDICIA) and a modified listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms in 1999—as quasi‐exogenous settings to investigate the effects of audit committee financial expertise on the timeliness of loan loss provisioning. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, I find that the timeliness of loan loss provisions increases with audit committee financial expertise both for the FDICIA treatment group, which had larger banks than the control group, and for the NYSE and NASDAQ exchange treatment group, which had smaller banks than the control group. Further, I find that the results are stronger for banks that have lower regulatory scrutiny, are audited by Big 4 auditors, and do not have staggered boards. Finally, I find that audit committee financial expertise decreases discretionary loan loss provisions and financial restatements. Overall, these findings suggest the importance of audit committee financial expertise in loan‐related matters, which is particularly relevant in the context of the recent Current Expected Credit Losses implementation.

Drawing on Robert Michels's “iron law” of oligarchy, this study examines a governance crisis that unfolded at one of the world's largest professional accounting bodies (PABs)—CPA Australia. We leverage Michels's century‐old contribution to the social sciences to explore how this crisis sheds light on the challenges that PAB governance arrangements can pose when PAB leadership and membership priorities conflict. By applying Michels's seminal work to theorize the origins, escalation, leadership collapse, and eventual resolution of this PAB governance crisis, we illuminate how governance arrangements fueled conflict and fostered a democratic deficit that frustrated sections of the membership in their attempts to debate issues, exercise accountability on leadership matters, and become involved in governance reform. Overall, our analysis reveals that despite espoused principles of equity and participation, PABs are vulnerable to oligarchy impacting how their leaders relate to the interests of their members. Implications for the capacity of PABs to accommodate member conflict and for member participation in the current‐day professional context are discussed.