Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the market for catastrophe event risk – i.e., financial claims that are linked to losses associated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Risk management theory suggests protection by insurers and other corporations against the largest cat events is most valuable. However, most insurers purchase relatively little cat reinsurance against large events, and premiums are high relative to expected losses. To understand why the theory fails, we examine transactions that look to capital markets, rather than traditional reinsurance markets, for risk-bearing capacity. We develop eight theoretical explanations and find the most compelling to be supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.

This paper investigates the impact of asset liquidity on the valuation of corporate securities and the firm's financing decisions. I show that asset liquidity increases debt capacity only when bond covenants restrict the disposition of assets. By contrast, I demonstrate that, with unsecured debt, greater liquidity increases credit spreads on corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage. The model also determines the extent to which pledging assets increases firm value and relates the optimal size of the pledge to firm and industry characteristics. Finally, I show that asset liquidity and security provisions may help explain leverage ratios and credit spreads observed in practice.

We examine determinants of non-executive employee stock option holdings, grants, and exercises for 756 firms during 1994–1997. We find that firms use greater stock option compensation when facing capital requirements and financing constraints. Our results are also consistent with firms using options to attract and retain certain types of employees as well as to create incentives to increase firm value. After controlling for economic determinants and stock returns, option exercises are greater (less) when the firm's stock price hits 52-week highs (lows), which confirms in a broad sample the psychological bias documented by Heath et al. (Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 601–628).

This paper examines seven instances in which the market value of a parent company was less than the market value of its publicly traded subsidiary. Efforts are made to explain this “parent company puzzle” in terms of taxes, agency costs, liquidity effects and noise trader risk. None of them work. The only explanation consistent with the evidence is a mispricing of the subsidiary shares associated with noise trader demand and impediments to arbitrage. As further evidence in support of this view, five corporate control transactions, all designed to exploit the apparent mispricing, were initiated while this research was in progress.

Estimates of average default probabilities for borrowers assigned to each of a financial institution's internal credit risk rating grades are crucial inputs to portfolio credit risk models. Such models are increasingly used in setting financial institution capital structure, in internal control and compensation systems, in asset-backed security design, and are being considered for use in setting regulatory capital requirements for banks. This paper empirically examines properties of the major methods currently used to estimate average default probabilities by grade. Evidence of potential problems of bias, instability, and gaming is presented. With care, and perhaps judicious application of multiple methods, satisfactory estimates may be possible. In passing, evidence is presented about other properties of internal and rating-agency ratings.

This paper analyzes and models the significant components of international trade in financial services, namely, foreign direct investment in banking for the US, the UK and Germany. It distinguishes between banks' activities abroad and FDI in banking by banks and non-banks. A model for FDI in banking is proposed which contains certain explanatory variables peculiar to FDI in banking as compared to FDI in manufacturing. The components of the model of FDI in banking is different from those models designed to explain banks activities abroad. The empirical results of this study of FDI in banking indicate that bilateral trade, banks' foreign assets, the cost of capital, relative economic growth, exchange rates and FDI in non-finance industries are the major determinants of foreign investment in banking.

This paper explores how to incorporate banks' capital structure and risk-taking into models of production. In doing so, the paper bridges the gulf between (1) the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and (2) the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank production without explicitly considering how banks' production decisions influence their riskiness. Various production models that differ in how they account for capital structure and in the objectives they impute to bank managers – cost minimization versus value maximization – are estimated using U.S. data on highest-level bank holding companies. Modeling the bank's objective as value maximization conveniently incorporates both market-priced risk and expected cash flow into managers' ranking and choice of production plans. Estimated scale economies are found to depend critically on how banks' capital structure and risk-taking are modeled. In particular, when equity capital, in addition to debt, is included in the production model and cost is computed from the value-maximizing expansion path rather than the cost-minimizing path, banks are found to have large scale economies that increase with size. Moreover, better diversification is associated with larger scale economies while increased risk-taking and inefficient risk-taking are associated with smaller scale economies.

In recent years, regulators have increased their focus on the capital adequacy of banking institutions to enhance the stability of the financial system. The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on whether and how Swiss Banks react to constraints placed by the regulator on their capital. Building on previous work by Shrieves and Dahl (cf. Shrieves, R.E., Dahl, D., 1992. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 439–457), we use a simultaneous equations model to analyse adjustments in capital and risk at Swiss banks, when those approach the minimum regulatory capital level. Our results indicate that regulatory pressure induce banks to increase their capital, but does not affect the level of risk.

This study examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock returns and risk. We find that FDICIA had a generally positive effect on bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk. The extent of the risk reduction varies based on the capitalization, size, and credit risk of the institutions with poorly capitalized, large, and high credit risk banks experiencing the greatest risk reduction. The results obtained using two separate control groups also bolster the conclusion that FDICIA’s passage resulted in a significant decline in bank risk.

This paper extracts both the implied default recovery ratio and the risk-neutral default probability term structure for Russian Federation and Republic of Argentina US dollar Eurobonds during the 1998 Russian default crisis. This crisis provides a unique window into the impact of changing default probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices. For the Russian Eurobonds, the sample paths suggest a two-phase crisis revaluation. Shifts in default probabilities account for most of the initial price collapse. Marked decreases in the implied default recovery ratio dominate the second phase. Investors never cut their recovery value assumptions for Argentine debt.