Knowledge that Transforms

With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.

We provide an analytical discussion of the optimal hedge ratio under discrepancies between the futures market price and its theoretical valuation according to the cost-of-carry model. Assuming a geometric Brownian motion for spot prices, we model mispricing as a specific noise component in the dynamics of futures market prices. Empirical evidence on the model is provided for the Spanish stock index futures. Ex-ante simulations with actual data reveal that hedge ratios that take into account the estimated, time varying, correlation between the common and specific disturbances, lead to using a lower number of futures contracts than under a systematic unit ratio, without generally losing hedging effectiveness, while reducing transaction costs and capital requirements. Besides, the reduction in the number of contracts can be substantial over some periods. Finally, a mean–variance expected utility function suggests that the economic benefits from an optimal hedge can be substantial.

We examine changes in bank risk following the passage of the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994 and find a significant decline in bank risk. The extent of interstate banking activity and the status of state-level interstate banking laws are important in explaining the risk reduction. Banks with assets in multiple states experience a significant reduction in risk whereas banks with assets in one state experience no significant change in risk. Banks in states with the most restrictive interstate banking provisions experience a significant decrease in risk whereas banks in states with more liberal interstate banking provisions experience a significant increase in risk.

The trading volume channeled through off-market crossing networks is growing. Passive matching of orders outside the primary market lowers several components of execution costs compared to regular trading. On the other hand, the risk of non-execution imposes opportunity costs, and the inherent “free riding” on the price discovery process raises concerns that this eventually will lead to lower liquidity in the primary market. Using a detailed data set from a large investor in the US equity markets, we find evidence that competition from crossing networks is concentrated in the most liquid stocks in a sample of the largest companies in the US. Simulations of alternative trading strategies indicate that the investor’s strategy of initially trying to cross all stocks was cost effective: in spite of their high liquidity, the crossed stocks would have been unlikely to achieve at lower execution costs in the open market.

This paper examines the effects of a series of events leading up to the deregulation of deposit interest rates in Hong Kong on the market value of banks. All the evidence suggests that banks earned rents from deposit interest rate rules (IRRs) and deregulation would lower these rents and hence bank market values. On average, the total abnormal return due to interest rates deregulation was around negative 4%. There is some evidence that large banks and banks with high deposit-to-asset ratio suffered a bigger drop in value, suggesting that these banks enjoyed a bigger subsidy under the IRRs.

After controlling for loan quality, liquidity, capitalization, and output mix, per unit bank operating costs are found to vary significantly across Asian countries and over time. Further analysis reveals that the country rankings of per unit labor and physical capital costs are highly correlated, suggesting that there exist systematic differences in bank operating efficiency across Asian countries. However, this measure of operating efficiency is found to be unrelated to the degree of openness of the banking sector. Asian bank operating costs were found to decline from 1992 to 1997, indicating that banks were improving their operating performance over time. Since 1997, the run-up in operating costs coincided with the Asian financial crisis, suggesting that banks were incurring additional costs in dealing with their problem loans while output was declining simultaneously. Moreover, the labor cost share is found to decline significantly between 1997 and 1999, indicating that banks were able to cut their labor force after the financial crisis but were less flexible to reduce physical capital input. Furthermore, significant differences in labor cost share are detected across countries, suggesting that different countries have different bank production functions. The variations in labor cost share are significantly positively related to the country’s financial services wage rate, suggesting that banks using relatively more labor in a particular country is due to the labor force productivity, rather than labor being cheap.

We show that organization structure of a stock exchange matters by utilizing the unique setting prevailing in India. India has two major stock markets, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). These two exchanges adopt similar trading systems, trade essentially identical stocks, and follow the same trading hours. However, these exchanges have different organizational structures: BSE is mutualized whereas NSE is demutualized. Using the Hasbrouck [Review of Financial Studies 6 (1993) 191] measure of market quality we show that NSE provides a better quality market than BSE. This result is consistent with the work of Domowitz and Steil [Brookings–Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 1999], who proposed that demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized in governance.

This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both information-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.

We model two dimensions of bank globalization – bank nationality (a bank from the firm’s host nation, its home nation, or a third nation) and bank reach (a global, regional, or local bank) using a two-stage nested multinomial logit model. Our data set includes over 2000 foreign affiliates of multinational corporations operating in 20 European nations and over 250 banks that serve them. We find that these firms frequently use host nation banks for cash management services, and that bank reach may be strongly influenced by this choice of bank nationality. Our results suggest limits to the degree of future bank globalization.

Reported earnings per share (EPS) are frequently rounded to the nearest cent. This paper provides evidence that firms manipulate earnings so that they can round-up and report one more cent of EPS. Specifically, we examine the digit immediately right of the decimal in the calculated EPS number expressed in cents. Evidence is presented that firms are more likely to round-up when managers ex ante expect rounding-up to meet analysts’ forecasts, report positive profits, or sustain recent performance. Further investigation provides evidence that working capital accruals are used to round-up EPS.