Knowledge that Transforms

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage-tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage-tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job-to-job movements as well as wage-tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.

I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas between pairs of players randomly selected from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit–maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.

The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents' beliefs. This bound yields, for example, competitive convergence as N →∞ in environments in which an appropriately-defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. We also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games: the “offer game” in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, and the “bidding game” in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal.

We provide a behavioral foundation to the notion of 'mixture' of acts, which is used to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by Anscombe and Aumann. Our construction allows one to formulate mixture-space axioms even in a fully subjective setting, without assuming the existence of randomizing devices. This simplifies the task of developing axiomatic models which only use behavioral data. Moreover, it is immune from the difficulty that agents may 'distort' the probabilities associated with randomizing devices. For illustration, we present simple subjective axiomatizations of some models of choice under uncertainty, including the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler, and Bewley's model of choice with incomplete preferences.

A predictor is asked to rank eventualities according to their plausibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking given any memory that consists of repetitions of past cases. Mild consistency requirements on these rankings imply that they have a numerical representation via a matrix assigning numbers to eventualitycase pairs, as follows. A memory is identified with a vector, counting the number of repetitions of each case. Multiplication of the matrix by a memory vector yields a numerical representation of the ordinal plausibility ranking given that memory. Interpreting this result for the ranking of theories or hypotheses, rather than of specific eventualities, it is shown that one may ascribe to the predictor subjective conditional probabilities of cases given theories, such that her rankings of theories agree with their likelihood functions. 1 Introduction It is well known that inductive inference is not logically valid. As David Hume (1748) put it, "... The co...

In this paper, we propose a simple bias–reduced log–periodogram regression estimator, ^dr, of the long–memory parameter, d, that eliminates the first– and higher–order biases of the Geweke and Porter–Hudak (1983) (GPH) estimator. The bias–reduced estimator is the same as the GPH estimator except that one includes frequencies to the power 2k for k=1,…,r, for some positive integer r, as additional regressors in the pseudo–regression model that yields the GPH estimator. The reduction in bias is obtained using assumptions on the spectrum only in a neighborhood of the zero frequency. Following the work of Robinson (1995b) and Hurvich, Deo, and Brodsky (1998), we establish the asymptotic bias, variance, and mean–squared error (MSE) of ^dr, determine the asymptotic MSE optimal choice of the number of frequencies, m, to include in the regression, and establish the asymptotic normality of ^dr. These results show that the bias of ^dr goes to zero at a faster rate than that of the GPH estimator when the normalized spectrum at zero is sufficiently smooth, but that its variance only is increased by a multiplicative constant. We show that the bias–reduced estimator ^dr attains the optimal rate of convergence for a class of spectral densities that includes those that are smooth of order s≥1 at zero when r≥(s−2)/2 and m is chosen appropriately. For s>2, the GPH estimator does not attain this rate. The proof uses results of Giraitis, Robinson, and Samarov (1997). We specify a data–dependent plug–in method for selecting the number of frequencies m to minimize asymptotic MSE for a given value of r. Some Monte Carlo simulation results for stationary Gaussian ARFIMA (1, d, 1) and (2, d, 0) models show that the bias–reduced estimators perform well relative to the standard log–periodogram regression estimator.

We present estimators for nonparametric functions that are nonadditive in unobservable random terms. The distributions of the unobservable random terms are assumed to be unknown. We show that when a nonadditive, nonparametric function is strictly monotone in an unobservable random term, and it satisfies some other properties that may be implied by economic theory, such as homogeneity of degree one or separability, the function and the distribution of the unobservable random term are identified. We also present convenient normalizations, to use when the properties of the function, other than strict monotonicity in the unobservable random term, are unknown. The estimators for the nonparametric function and for the distribution of the unobservable random term are shown to be consistent and asymptotically normal. We extend the results to functions that depend on a multivariate random term. The results of a limited simulation study are presented.

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions—in terms of game balancedness—for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.

We study the problem of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in the presence of unbounded returns. We introduce a new approach based both on consideration of a metric on the space of all continuous functions over the state space, and on the application of some metric fixed point theorems. With appropriate conditions we prove uniqueness of solutions with respect to the whole space of continuous functions. Furthermore, the paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions that can be applied to fairly general models. It is also proven that the fixed point coincides with the value function and that it can be approached by successive iterations of the Bellman operator.