Knowledge that Transforms

We use experimental markets to examine stock-based compensation's impact on the objectivity of participants serving as audit committee members.We compare audit committee member reporting objectivity under three regimes: no stock-based compensation, stock-based compensation linked to current shareholders, and stock-based compensation linked to future shareholders. Our experiments show that student participants serving as audit committee members prefer biased reporting when compensated with stock-based compensation. Audit committee members compensated with current stock-based compensation prefer aggressive reporting, and audit committee members compensated with future stock-based compensation prefer overly conservative reporting. We find that audit committee members who do not receive stock-based compensation are the most objective. Our study suggests that stock-based compensation impacts audit committee member preferences for biased reporting, suggesting the need for additional research in this area.

This study evaluates the impact of earnings on credit risk in the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market using levels, changes, and event study analyses. We find that earnings (cash flows, accruals) of reference firms are negatively and significantly correlated with the level of CDS premia, consistent with earnings (cash flows, accruals) conveying information about default risk. Based on the changes analysis, a 1 percent increase in ROA decreases CDS rates significantly by about 5 percent. We also find that (1) CDS premia are more highly correlated with below-median earnings than with above-median earnings and (2) CDS premia are more highly correlated with earnings of low-rated firms than with earnings of high-rated firms. Evidence indicates further that short-window earnings surprises are negatively and significantly correlated with CDS premia changes in the three-day window surrounding the preliminary earnings announcement, although the impact is concentrated in the shorter maturities.

Using data from the EDGAR era, we find a significant market reaction surrounding quarterly periodic reports only when their filing coincides with the first public disclosure of earnings, although that for 10-K reports is not subsumed by earnings releases. However, after eliminating incidence of concurrent earnings releases, the 10-K market reaction is restricted to a quarter of the reports that are filed around calendar quarter-ends. The calendar quarter-end price and volume effects are unrelated to the filing of periodic reports and are not explained by self-selection. However, while the quarter-end volume reaction is indistinguishable between filers and non-filers, we find an incremental price reaction to 10-K filings at calendar quarter-ends in recent times. We provide evidence that the calendar-time effect is partially due to an intraindustry information transfer that is a function of the incidence of 10-K reports at quarter-ends. Finally, equity analyst reactions are muted around periodic filings, with no evidence that they contribute to quarter-end information transfer.

Beginning with Patell and Wolfson (1982), several papers have documented that earnings announcements made after the market closes and/or on Fridays tend to contain worse earnings news than those made at other times. One hypothesis is that opportunistic managers release earnings at these times of decreased media attention to “hide” their bad news and reduce the associated market penalty. Using firm-level tests that focus on only those firms that switch their disclosure timing (rather than consistently report at the same time), we find no evidence that managers opportunistically report worse news after the market closes or on Fridays. We then explore other determinants of the timing decision, including the more benign hypothesis that managers with worse earnings news release earnings after the market closes to more broadly disseminate the information. Consistent with desiring more time for the market to assimilate the announcement, we find some evidence that more complex firms tend to announce earnings after the market closes. We also find that these announcements are associated with greater abnormal volume, possibly indicating a successful dissemination strategy. We also find that the corporate headquarters location, the size of the firm, the number of analysts covering the firm, and industry membership are all significant explanatory variables for the timing decision. Overall, our findings are consistent with efficient capital markets that are effective at monitoring new information, regardless of the time of the announcement.

We study turnover and promotions of division managers in multidivisional firms. Turnover is negatively related to divisional accounting performance, positively related to industry performance, but not significantly related to firm performance or the performance of other divisions. Consistent with tournament theory, promotions are significantly related to whether one division is performing better than others, but are not significantly related to the magnitude of any performance difference. A simple performance metric, divisional ROA, appears more closely related to job allocation decisions than several alternatives. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that accounting information is used by firms when evaluating managerial personnel.

This study provides evidence of changes in how analysts generate stock recommendations after the SEC's approval of NASD Rule 2711 in May 2002, which introduced regulatory reforms to enhance the independence of analysts' research. We investigate the relations of analysts' stock recommendations with intrinsic value estimates (based on analysts' earnings forecasts relative to the stock prices, V/P) and with investment-banking-related conflicts of interest during the 1994–2005 period. We find a stronger relation between analysts' stock recommendations and V/P and a weaker relation between analysts' stock recommendations and conflicts of interest in the post-Rule period than prior to the implementation of the Rule. Moreover, the increases in the relation between stock recommendations and V/P after the implementation of the Rule are greater for the stocks recommended by analysts with greater potential conflicts of interest. Our findings suggest that the implementation of Rule 2711 has enhanced analysts' independence.

Internal auditors perform work that is relevant to their host entities' financial reporting processes; yet, little research attention has focused on the effects of internal auditing on companies' external financial reporting. Using a unique and previously unavailable data set, we investigate the relation between internal audit function (IAF) quality and earnings management. We measure IAF quality using a composite measure comprising six individual components of IAF quality based on SAS No. 65, which guides external auditors in assessing the quality of an IAF with respect to its role in financial reporting. Earnings management is measured using two separate proxies: (1) abnormal accruals and (2) the propensity to meet or barely beat analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence that IAF quality is associated with a moderation in the level of earnings management as measured by both proxies.

We perform an asset market experiment in order to investigate whether overconfidence induces trading. We investigate three manifestations of overconfidence: calibration-based overconfidence, the better-than-average effect and illusion of control. Novelly, the measure employed for calibration-based overconfidence is task-specific in that it is designed to influence behavior. We find that calibration-based overconfidence does engender additional trade, though the better-than-average also appears to play a role. This is true both at the level of the individual and also at the level of the market. There is little evidence that gender influences trading activity.

We analyze the effects that real-time domestic and foreign news about fundamentals have on the co-movement between stock returns of a small, open economy, Portugal, and a large economy, the United States. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find that US macroeconomic news and Portuguese earnings news do not affect stock market co-movement, whereas Portuguese macroeconomic news lowers stock market co-movement. We find that US news affects Portuguese stock market returns, though less so when US stock market returns are included in the regression. We provide evidence, contrary to common wisdom, that this last result does not derive from contagion.

We establish an empirical link between the ex-ante uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals and the ex-post resolution of this uncertainty in financial markets. We measure macroeconomic uncertainty using prices of economic derivatives and relate this measure to changes in implied volatilities of stock and bond options when the economic data is released. Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with greater reduction in implied volatilities following the news release. It is also associated with increased volume and decreased open interest in option markets after the release, consistent with market participants using financial options to hedge or speculate on macroeconomic news.