Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a novel measure of arbitrage activity to examine whether arbitrageurs can have a destabilizing effect on the stock market. We focus on stock price momentum, a classic example of a positive-feedback strategy that our theory predicts can be destabilizing. Our measure, dubbed comomentum, is the high-frequency abnormal return correlation among stocks on which a typical momentum strategy would speculate. When comomentum is low, momentum strategies are stabilizing, reflecting an underreaction phenomenon that arbitrageurs correct. When comomentum is high, the returns on momentum stocks strongly revert, reflecting prior overreaction from crowded momentum trading that pushes prices away from fundamentals.

We investigate the information contained in foreign exchange (FX) volume using a novel data set from the over-the-counter market. We find volume helps predict next-day currency returns and is economically valuable for currency investors. Predictability implies a stronger return reversal for currency pairs with abnormally low volume and is driven by the component of volume unrelated to volatility, liquidity, and order flow. We rationalize these findings via a simple model, in which FX volume helps reveal the degree of asymmetric information in currency markets. Testing this prediction shows that asymmetric information is uniform across currency pairs but varies across instruments.

Recent empirical studies have shown that innovative firms heavily rely on debt financing. Debt overhang implies that debt hampers innovation by incumbents. A second effect of debt is that it stimulates innovation by entrants. Using a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous R&D and financing choices, we demonstrate that this second effect always dominates, so that debt fosters innovation and growth at the aggregate level. Our analysis suggests that the relation between debt and investment is more complex than previously acknowledged and highlights potential limitations of empirical work that solely focuses on incumbents when measuring the effects of debt on investment.

We analyze the effects of a reform of capital regulation for U.S. insurance companies in 2009. The reform eliminates capital buffers against unexpected losses associated with portfolio holdings of MBS, but not for other fixed-income assets. After the reform, insurance companies are much more likely to retain downgraded MBS compared to other downgraded assets. This pattern is more pronounced for financially constrained insurers. Exploiting discontinuities in the reform’s implementation, we can identify the relevance of the capital requirements channel. We also document that the insurance industry crowds outs other investors in the new issuance of (high-yield) MBS.

We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.

We analyze the impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on real decision-making within the firm. Our structural model predicts that CDS introduction increases debt capacity more when uncertainty about the credit events that trigger CDS payment is lower. Using a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries, we find that CDSs increase leverage more in legal and market environments where uncertainty about CDS obligations is reduced and when property rights are weaker. Our results highlight the importance of legal uncertainty in the interpretation of the underlying trigger events of global credit derivatives.

Higher country taxes on noxious manufacturing emissions lead to substantial increases in firms’ R&D spending. The R&D response is entirely driven by those high-pollution firms most affected by emissions taxes. Pollution taxes increase the marginal value of R&D spending in polluting firms, even when this spending does not lead to new innovation. Pollution taxes have the strongest effect on R&D investment in sectors in which new invention is difficult to appropriate and outside knowledge is easier to acquire, suggesting an important reason dirty firms invest in R&D is to expand their capacity to absorb external knowledge and technical know-how.

We study how retail savings products can share market risk across investor cohorts, thereby completing financial markets. Financial intermediaries smooth returns by varying reserves, which are passed on between successive investor cohorts, thereby redistributing wealth across cohorts. Using data on euro contracts sold by life insurers in France, we estimate this redistribution to be large: 0.8% of GDP. We develop and provide evidence for a model in which low investor sophistication, while leading to individually suboptimal decisions, improves risk sharing by allowing intercohort risk sharing.

Do potential entrepreneurs remain in wage employment because of concerns that they will face worse job opportunities should their entrepreneurial ventures fail? Using a Canadian reform that extends job-protected leave to one year for women giving birth after a cutoff date, we study whether the option to return to a previous job increases entrepreneurship. A regression discontinuity design reveals that a longer job-protected leave increases entrepreneurship by 1.9 percentage points. These entrepreneurs start incorporated businesses that hire employees, in industries in which experimentation before entry has low costs and high benefits.

Public pension boards fear inciting stakeholder outrage if they compensate internal investment managers with market-level salaries. We derive theoretical implications in an agency-portfolio-choice model motivated by inequality aversion. In a global sample, relaxing the effect of outrage on contracting leads to an average annual incremental value-added of $49 million generated through 11 bps in higher excess returns from risky assets, at the cost of $302,429 in additional compensation. Governance reforms that address outrage by reducing political appointees or requiring independent skills-based boards can increase the annual value-added. These findings are orthogonal to costly political distortions from underfunding and pay-to-play schemes.