Knowledge that Transforms

We build a quantitative spatial model in which some workers can substitute on-site effort with work done from home. Ability and propensity to telecommute vary by education and industry. We quantify our framework to match the distribution of jobs and residents across 4,502 U.S. locations. Then, we simulate permanent increases in the attractiveness and productivity of telework that lead to greater adoption of hybrid and fully remote work. To validate our model, we show that our results are positively correlated with local changes in residents, jobs, and housing costs since 2019. The rise of telework results in a rich non-monotonic pattern of reallocations of residents and jobs within and across cities. Workers who can telecommute experience welfare gains, and those who cannot suffer losses. Broader access to jobs reduces wage inequality across residential locations, and heralds a partial reversal in the spatial concentration of talent and spending power known as the “Great Divergence”.

In a data economy, transactions of goods and services generate data, which is stored, traded and depreciates. How are the economics of this economy different from traditional production economies? How do these differences matter for measurement of GDP, firm values, depreciation rates, welfare and externalities? We incorporate active experimentation and data as an intangible asset to devise a tractable recursive representation of the data economy. The model rationalizes why apps are often “free” and why even non-digital economic activity might be greater than GDP suggests. Calibrating the model using a combination of macroeconomic and financial moments suggests that the mis-measurement in U.S. GDP due to missing value of data has been as high as 6% in 2018.

Digitization reforms have been hailed as an effective way of strengthening state capacity. However, digitization can also fundamentally reshape the organization of bureaucracies. Using a unique administrative dataset on agricultural taxation and surveys of local bureaucrats from Punjab, Pakistan, we show that digitization reforms can have unintended consequences for state capacity. We exploit the staggered rollout of the digitization of land records in Punjab to show that digitization had a negative effect on tax collection. The fall in taxes was not due to a decrease in the tax base. Instead, digitization affected the bureaucrats’ capacity to collect taxes.

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision.

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing that missing information can be a channel through which misperceptions arise.

We examine how social interactions and friendships shape students' political opinions in a natural experiment at Sciences Po, a leading French university specializing in social and political sciences. The quasi-random assignment of students into short-term integration groups before their academic curriculum reduces political opinion gaps and fosters friendship formation. Using same-group membership as an instrumental variable for friendship, we find that friendship reduces opinion differences by 40% of a standard deviation in the opinion gap. Our evidence supports a homophily-enforced mechanism: friendships form among initially politically similar students, leading them to join political associations together, reinforcing their similarity. However, friendship does not significantly influence politically dissimilar pairs. Instead, it reduces opinion divergence without enforcing ideological convergence.

We consider an economy in which long-lived experts are matched with short-lived clients. Experts choose the type of client with whom they match, unobserved by the market. The interaction outcome depends on both the expert’s and the client’s type. We study the effects of supplying information about otherwise unobservable outcomes, such as “medical report cards,” to help clients identify better experts. Such information can lead to inefficient matches, as experts reject risky clients to build their reputation. Hence, information can reduce welfare. Withholding information can mitigate these perverse incentives at the cost of misallocating experts known to be inept.

Weekly lotteries determine which politicians ask the UK prime minister a question in front of a male-dominated, noisy chamber. Lottery winners receive 4 percent higher vote margin in the next election, but women are 12 percent less likely to submit questions than same-cohort men. The gender gap does not close with lottery-induced experience asking a question, but it closes after a format change, with questions asked to a smaller, quieter audience. The switch differentially draws in women with quieter voices. Our findings support institutional change, rather than experience, as a response to gender gaps in adversarial settings like the UK Parliament.

This paper shows that the wage assimilation of immigrants is the result of the intricate interplay between individual skill accumulation and dynamic labor market equilibrium effects. When immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes, rising immigrant inflows widen the wage gap between them. Using a production function framework in which workers supply both general and host-country-specific skills, we show that this labor market competition channel explains about one-fifth of the large increase in the average immigrant–native wage gap across arrival cohorts in the United States since the 1960s. The results further reveal substantial heterogeneity across different groups of immigrants.

We introduce an empirical framework for valuing markets in environmental offsets. Using newly-collected data on wetland conservation and offsets, we apply this framework to evaluate a set of decentralized markets in Florida, where land developers purchase offsets from long-lived producers who restore wetlands over time. We find that offsets led to substantial private gains from trade, creating $2.4 billion of net surplus from 1995–2020 relative to direct conservation. Offset trading also generated new hydrological externalities. A locally differentiated Pigouvian tax would have prevented $1.6 billion of new flood damage while preserving more than two-thirds of the private gains from trade.