Knowledge that Transforms

Experimental evidence has consistently confirmed the ability of uninformed traders, even novices, to infer information from the trading process. After contrasting brain activation in subjects watching markets with and without insiders, we hypothesize that Theory of Mind (ToM) helps explain this pattern, where ToM refers to the human capacity to discern malicious or benevolent intent. We find that skill in predicting price changes in markets with insiders correlates with scores on two ToM tests. We document GARCH‐like persistence in transaction price changes that may help investors read markets when there are insiders.

We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary‐based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate‐level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch‐based structures are preferred to subsidiary‐based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Greater cross‐country risk correlation and more accurate pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. Furthermore, a bank's corporate structure affects its risk taking and affiliate size.

We present evidence supporting the hypothesis that due to investor specialization and market segmentation, value‐relevant information diffuses gradually in financial markets. Using the stock market as our setting, we find that (i) stocks that are in economically related supplier and customer industries cross‐predict each other's returns, (ii) the magnitude of return cross‐predictability declines with the number of informed investors in the market as proxied by the level of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and (iii) changes in the stock holdings of institutional investors mirror the model trading behavior of informed investors.

This paper studies the relation between corporate liquidity and diversification. The key finding is that multidivision firms hold significantly less cash than stand‐alone firms because they are diversified in their investment opportunities. Lower cross‐divisional correlations in investment opportunity and higher correlations between investment opportunity and cash flow correspond to lower cash holdings, even after controlling for cash flow volatility. The effects are strongest in financially constrained firms and in well‐governed firms, and correspond to efficient fund transfers from low‐ to high‐productivity divisions. Taken together, these results bring forth an efficient link between diversification and corporate liquidity.

Traditional real options models demonstrate the importance of the “option to wait” due to uncertainty over future shocks to project cash flows. However, there is often another important source of uncertainty: uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks. Adding Bayesian uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks augments the traditional option to wait with an additional “option to learn.” The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that in standard models. For example, investment may occur at a time of stable or decreasing cash flows, respond sluggishly to cash flow shocks, and depend on the timing of project cash flows.

Individuals differ in how they construct their investment portfolios, yet empirical models of portfolio risk typically account only for a small portion of the cross‐sectional variance. This paper asks whether genetic variation can explain some of these individual differences. Following a major pension reform Swedish adults had to form a portfolio from a large menu of funds. We match data on these investment decisions with the Swedish Twin Registry and find that approximately 25% of individual variation in portfolio risk is due to genetic variation. We also find that these results extend to several other aspects of financial decision‐making.

Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms’ insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock‐price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h‐6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock‐price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h‐6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.

This paper examines how cultural differences influence the returns of momentum strategies. Cross‐country cultural differences are measured with an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001) , which is related to overconfidence and self‐attribution bias. We find that individualism is positively associated with trading volume and volatility, as well as to the magnitude of momentum profits. Momentum profits are also positively related to analyst forecast dispersion, transaction costs, and the familiarity of the market to foreigners, and negatively related to firm size and volatility. However, the addition of these and other variables does not dampen the relation between individualism and momentum profits.

Defining contagion as correlation over and above that expected from economic fundamentals, we find strong evidence of worst return contagion across hedge fund styles for 1990 to 2008. Large adverse shocks to asset and hedge fund liquidity strongly increase the probability of contagion. Specifically, large adverse shocks to credit spreads, the TED spread, prime broker and bank stock prices, stock market liquidity, and hedge fund flows are associated with a significant increase in the probability of hedge fund contagion. While shocks to liquidity are important determinants of performance, these shocks are not captured by commonly used models of hedge fund returns.

We examine how product market competition affects firm cash flows and stock returns in industry booms and busts. Our results show how real and financial factors interact in industry business cycles. In competitive industries, we find that high industry‐level stock market valuation, investment, and financing are followed by sharply lower operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns. Analyst estimates are positively biased and returns comove more. In concentrated industries these relations are weak and generally insignificant. Our results are consistent with participants in competitive industries not fully internalizing the negative externality of industry competition on cash flows and stock returns.