We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar (industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive winning. (

We explain when and how staggered difference-in-differences regression estimators, commonly applied to assess the impact of policy changes, are biased. These biases are likely to be relevant for a large portion of research settings in finance, accounting, and law that rely on staggered treatment timing, and can result in Type-I and Type-II errors. We summarize three alternative estimators developed in the econometrics and applied literature for addressing these biases, including their differences and tradeoffs. We apply these estimators to re-examine prior published results and show, in many cases, the alternative causal estimates or inferences differ substantially from prior papers.

We use New York City (NYC) taxi data to identify trips between mutual fund offices and local firm headquarters. NYC funds overweight the stocks of local firms they visit via taxi, and firm visits are associated with superior investment performance. Firm visits are elevated prior to earnings announcements, and mutual fund trades that are associated with firm taxi visits predict earnings surprises. The results are generally stronger when fund and firm executives share educational connections. Additional tests support the conclusion that funds’ local bias and investment performance are driven by portfolio managers’ efforts and ability to actively gather material information.