Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”
This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.
This paper develops a model of active asset management in which fund managers may forgo alpha‐generating strategies, preferring instead to make negative‐alpha trades that enable them to temporarily manipulate investors' perceptions of their skills. We show that such trades are optimally generated by taking on hidden tail risk, and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient and when their trading skills are scalable, and generate a high profit per unit of risk. We propose long‐term contracts that deter this behavior by dynamically adjusting the dates on which the manager is compensated in response to her cumulative performance.
This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand‐collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90 th to the 10 th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.
We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor‐level tax evasion and its effect on foreign portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round‐tripping tax evasion in which U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker's ( ) economic theory of crime, we identify the tax evasion component by examining how foreign portfolio investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor‐level tax evasion affecting cross‐border equity and debt investment.
Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.
American Economic Review2015105(1), 411-444open access
This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal-and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas) and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion.
The Accounting Review201590(5), 1839-1870open access
Prior studies show that equity value has convex relations with earnings and book value of equity, respectively, due to growth and adaptation options (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Zhang 2000). However, these studies do not consider the role of institutions in affecting firms' ability to exercise growth and adaptation options. In this study, we investigate whether these convex relations vary with the degree of a country's economic freedom, which may influence the frictions and costs of exercising these options. We develop four hypotheses: In countries with greater economic freedom: (1) a firm's capital investment in response to profitability is greater; (2) the relation between equity value and earnings, given equity book value, is more convex; (3) the relation between equity value and equity book value, given earnings, is more convex; and (4) the relation between stock return and profitability change is more convex. Using the Economic Freedom of the World index from the Fraser Institute, we test our hypotheses with data from 30 countries during the 2000–2010 period. The empirical results are consistent with these hypotheses. The effect of economic freedom that we document is distinct from the effects of GDP level and growth, legal origin, law enforcement, investor protection, and quality of accounting standards. Our results suggest that greater economic freedom enhances equity value through more efficient management of investment options. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.
The Accounting Review201590(1), 321-350open access
Prior studies find inconsistent evidence regarding the effect of CEO equity incentives on financial misreporting. We argue that this inconsistency stems from not considering detection mechanisms that mitigate the effect of equity incentives on misreporting by limiting the ability of managers to carry out such manipulative activities. Using auditor industry expertise as one such detection mechanism, we document that CEO equity incentives are positively associated with misreporting only in subsamples where auditor expertise is low, but not where expertise is high. The implication of these results is that auditor expertise lowers the cost of granting equity-based incentives and that firms audited by an industry expert grant their CEOs greater equity incentives. We find strong evidence in favor of this implication. Controlling for previously identified determinants of CEO equity incentives, we find that firms audited by an industry expert grant their CEOs 14 percent more equity incentives than firms audited by a non-expert. To address endogeneity concerns, we use the collapse of Arthur Andersen as a quasi-natural experiment and find analogous evidence. Overall, our study documents the critical role of detection mechanisms in the link between CEO contracting and financial misreporting.