Knowledge that Transforms

Sudden stops have been linked to a number of financial crises in emerging market countries. While a large literature has developed emphasizing the importance of institutions and governance in reducing economic volatility, this paper finds that the effect of government quality on the incidence of sudden stops is non-linear. Initial improvements in governance actually increase the incidence of costly sudden stops. A possible explanation is that improved governance encourages capital inflows that can overwhelm banking systems in countries with weak institutions. What is striking is that this result holds for a large number of countries including those with average levels of institutional quality that already receive considerable inflows. Eventually, however, improving institutions does reduce the frequency of sudden stops, allowing countries to enjoy the benefits of financial globalization with fewer risks.

This research investigates the intrinsic characteristics of currency values by fundamentally decomposing investor expectations on 16 currencies. The results on 195 exchange rates over several decades indicate investors perceive countries to be more likely to choose devaluation solutions to BOP problems when inflation is lower and when an alternative drop in real income growth is more “painful”. In addition, empirical support is provided for the hypothesis that forward rates often appear biased because the distributional expectations incorporated into them include, for a country with a current account deficit, a small probability of a large spot decline that does not actually occur in most finite samples.

We empirically investigate the effect of financial distress on corporate ownership and control. Our analysis is based on a panel of 267 German firms that suffered from repeated interest coverage shortfalls between 1996 and 2004. We track each firm’s development over the distress cycle with particular attention to corporate ownership, restructuring, and management turnover. We find a significant decrease in ownership concentration. Private investors gradually give up their dominating role and thereby cease to be an effective source of managerial control. By contrast, ownership representation by banks and outside investors almost doubles. Shareholdings by executive and non-executive directors also substantially increase but have no effect on managerial tenure. Forced management turnover is mostly initiated by outside investors and banks and often occurs subsequent to debt restructurings, block investments, and takeovers.

Risk-shifting window dressing and a preferred habitat for liquidity have been offered as possible explanations as to why US money market rates are higher before the year-end than afterwards. The two hypotheses differ in the timing of the rate decline at the year-end and the evidence on the timing of the decline supports the preferred habitat hypothesis in US money markets. This paper extends this line of research to the behavior of international short-term interest rates at year-ends and quarter-ends using London interbank offer rates (LIBOR) for 11 different currencies. The results suggest that the behavior of LIBOR for five currencies: the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and German Mark is consistent with year-end or quarter-end preferred habitats for liquidity. Other currencies do not demonstrate consistently distinct patterns in turn-of-the-year and turn-of-the-quarter yields. None of the results provides any support for risk-shifting window dressing.

We show how a high degree of commonality in investor liquidity shocks can diminish incentives for intermediaries to keep markets open and lead to market collapse, even without information asymmetry or news affecting fundamentals. We motivate our model using the perpetual floating-rate note market where two years of explosive growth – in which issues by high quality borrowers were placed with institutional investors and traded in a liquid secondary market – were followed by a precipitous collapse when market intermediaries withdrew due to large order imbalances. We shed new light on the trade-off between ownership concentration and market liquidity.

This paper analyzes the implications of the advanced measurement approach (AMA) for the assessment of operational risk. Through a clinical case study on a matrix of two selected business lines and two event types of a large financial institution, we develop a procedure that addresses the major issues faced by banks in the implementation of the AMA. For each cell, we calibrate two truncated distributions functions, one for “normal” losses and the other for the “extreme” losses. In addition, we propose a method to include external data in the framework. We then estimate the impact of operational risk management on bank profitability, through an adapted measure of RAROC. The results suggest that substantial savings can be achieved through active management techniques.

Parametric term structure models have been successfully applied to numerous problems in fixed income markets, including pricing, hedging, managing risk, as well as to the study of monetary policy implications. In turn, dynamic term structure models, equipped with stronger economic structure, have been mainly adopted to price derivatives and explain empirical stylized facts. In this paper, we combine flavors of those two classes of models to test whether no-arbitrage affects forecasting. We construct cross-sectional (allowing arbitrages) and arbitrage-free versions of a parametric polynomial model to analyze how well they predict out-of-sample interest rates. Based on US Treasury yield data, we find that no-arbitrage restrictions significantly improve forecasts. Arbitrage-free versions achieve overall smaller biases and root mean square errors for most maturities and forecasting horizons. Furthermore, a decomposition of forecasts into forward-rates and holding return premia indicates that the superior performance of no-arbitrage versions is due to a better identification of bond risk premium.

Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.

This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.